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INTRODUCTION 
Mandatory disclosure has been at the core of U.S. securities 
regulation since its adoption in the early 1930s. For many decades, this 
fixture of our financial system was accepted with little examination. 
Over the last twenty years, however, mandatory disclosure has been 
subject to intensifying intellectual crosscurrents. Some commentators 
hold out the U.S. system as the standard for the world. They argue 
that adoption by other countries of a U.S.-styled system, with its 
greater corporate transparency, would enhance their economic 
performance.1 Other commentators, in contrast, insist that the U.S. 
mandatory disclosure regime represents a mistake, not a model.2 
These crosscurrents are reflected as well in the actions and words of 
policymakers. On the one hand, Congress, responding to the recent 
spate of corporate scandals, enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,3 which 
amended the U.S. securities laws to require what is probably the 
greatest increase in disclosure since their inception. On the other 
hand, the Council of Economic Advisors, in its discussion of these 
reforms in the 2003 Economic Report of the President, agnostically 
stated that "whether SEC-enforced disclosure rules actually improve 
the quality of information that investors receive remains a subject of 
debate among researchers almost 70 years after the SEC's creation."4 
Most debate between these contending positions has been at the 
level of theory.5 The surprisingly small amount of empirical research 
brought to bear on the issues involved is relatively equivocal in its 
implications.6 This Article introduces to the legal debate important 
1. See, e.g. , Bernard S. Black, The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong 
Securities Markets, 48 UCLA L. REV. 781, 787 (2001); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future as 
History: The Prospects for Global Convergence in Corporate Governance and Its 
Implications, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. 641 (1999); James D.  Cox, Symposium: Regulatory Duopoly 
in U.S. Securities Markets, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1200 { 1999). 
2. See, e.g., George Benston, Required Disclosure and the Stock Market: An Evaluation 
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 63 AM. ECON. REV. 132 (1973); Stephen J. Choi & 
Andrew T. Guzman, Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking the International Reach of Securities 
Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 903, 907 (1998); Jonathan R. Macey, Administrative Agency 
Obsolescence and Interest Group Formation: A Case Study of the SEC at Sixty, 15 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 909, 928 (1994); Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to 
Securities Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359 (1998) [hereinafter Romano, Empowering 
Investors]; George Stigler, Public Regulation of the Securities Markets, 37 J. Bus. 117 (1964). 
3. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered 
sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
4. ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 95-97 (2003). 
5. See infra Part I. 
6. Two prominent financial accounting commentators recently stated, "Whether there is a 
market failure for disclosure and whether it is corrected through regulation are empirical 
questions. However, empirical research on these questions is virtually non-existent." Paul M. Healy 
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new empirical evidence based on recent research of the authors and 
others that, while not definitively settling the overall question of 
mandatory disclosure's desirability, helps resolve two central, highly 
disputed questions: 
- Is the efficiency of the real economy (the actual production 
of goods and services) enhanced when share prices become 
more accurate? 
- Do rules mandating that issuers make public disclosures 
actually increase share price accuracy?7 
Contrary to the arguments advanced by opponents of mandatory 
disclosure, the empirical evidence presented here suggests that both of 
these questions should be answered in the affirmative. 
Part I of this Article briefly reviews the debate in the existing legal 
literature concerning these two questions. Part II sets out the basic 
concepts needed to understand the new empirical evidence: the ideas 
of share price accuracy and share price informedness, and the 
relatively new technique called the R2 methodology, which we use to 
measure share price accuracy. Part III discusses studies utilizing the R2 
methodology recently published in the finance literature by authors of 
this Article and others, which strongly suggest that greater share price 
accuracy does lead to enhanced efficiency in the real economy. Part 
IV presents the results of a new study that we have conducted utilizing 
the R2 methodology that suggest that mandatory disclosure does in fact 
increase the amount of meaningful information reflected in share 
prices. The study examines the effects of the change in disclosure 
rules, adopted in December 1980, that enhanced the requirements 
concerning management discussion and analysis of issuer financial 
condition and operating results (the "MD&A" requirements). This 
& Krishna G. Palepu, Information Asymmetry, Corporate Disclosure, and the Capital Markets: A 
Review of the Empirical Disclosure Literature, 31 J. ACCT. & ECON. 405, 412 (2001) (emphasis 
added). 
The empirical literature that does exist primarily addresses the initial impact of the 
imposition of the U.S. mandatory disclosure securities laws in the 1930s. For a critical review 
of the existing empirical literature, see Merritt B. Fox, The Issuer Choice Debate, 2 
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 563, 602-07 (2001) [hereinafter Fox, Issuer Choice]; Merritt B. 
Fox, Retaining Mandatory Disclosure: Why Issuer Choice is Not Investor Empowerment, 85 
VA. L. REV. 1334, 1369-95 (1999) [hereinafter Fox, Retaining Mandatory Disclosure]. 
7. The question of the link between mandatory disclosure and share price accuracy 
subsumes two more specific operational questions. One is whether mandatory disclosure 
rules succeed in promoting an increase in meaningful public disclosure. The other is whether 
issuer public disclosure plays an important role in enhancing share price accuracy, or 
whether the other routes by which information is gathered, analyzed and acted upon (insider 
trading, selective disclosure, independent research by analysts, etc.) predominate in the 
setting of share prices. Opponents to mandatory disclosure raise both of these more specific 
operational questions. See infra Part LC. An affirmative answer to the larger question of the 
link between mandatory disclosure and share price accuracy would imply an affirmative 
answer to both of these more specific operational questions as well. A negative answer to the 
larger question would suggest a negative answer to one or both of the two more specific 
operational questions. 
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change for the first time effectively requires managers to disclose any 
material information that suggests that the issuer's most recent results 
are not necessarily indicative of future operating results or future 
financial condition. Our study suggests that share prices did in fact 
become more informed as a result of the enhanced MD&A 
requirements. 
I. THE EXISTING LEGAL DEBATE 
A. The Traditional Consensus and Its Collapse 
For the first three decades following passage of the Securities Act 
of 1933 ("Securities Act") and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
("Exchange Act"), most securities law commentators took the 
desirability of mandatory disclosure as a given. These commentators 
believed that the primary purpose of the securities laws is to promote 
faimess.8 In their view, price accuracy promotes fairness because it is 
unfair for a purchaser to pay more for a share than it is really worth. 
To them, mandatory disclosure is beneficial because it clarifies the 
value of the share and therefore makes such unfair overpayment less 
likely.9 
This consensus began to break down as discussion of securities law 
started to be infused with financial economics. Financial economics 
suggests that disclosure is not necessary to protect investors against 
unfair prices. The efficient market hypothesis ("EMH")10 holds that 
the price of a thickly traded stock is unbiased - i.e., on average equal 
to the stock's actual value1 1  - and this is true whether there is a great 
deal of information available about the issuer or only a little. 12 Thus, a 
law requiring issuers to disclose more information than they would 
otherwise voluntarily disclose is unnecessary to protect ordinary 
8. See John A. C. Hetherington, Insider Trading and the Logic of the Law, 1967 WIS. L. 
REV. 720; Homer Kripke, Manne's Insider Trading Thesis and Other Failures of 
Conservative Economics, 4 CATO J. 945 (1985); Roy A. Schotland, Unsafe at Any Price: A 
Reply to Manne, Insider Trading and the Stock Market, 53 VA. L. REV.1425 (1967). 
9. Mandatory periodic disclosure would also make less likely the reciprocal unfairness 
where an investor sells a share in the secondary market for less than it is worth. 
10. See infra note 41 and accompanying text. 
11. The term "actual value" is discussed infra in Part II.A.I. 
12. This conclusion stems from empirical work showing unbiased reactions to 
announcements of corporate information, see infra note 41, and from the proposition that 
there is no reason to believe that the market will not also be unbiased in its reactions to 
issuer absences of comment about certain matters. For a more complete discussion of this 
point with citations to the literature, as well as consideration of why the noise-theory critique 
of the EMH does not undermine this argument in ways that create a strong fairness 
argument for mandatory disclosure, see Merritt B. Fox, Securities Disclosure in a 
Globalizing Market: Who Should Regulate Whom, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2498, 2533-39 (1997) 
[hereinafter Fox, Disclosure in a Globalizing Market] . 
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investors from buying shares at prices that are unfair in the sense of 
being on average greater than their actual values.13 
Attention thus shifted from the effects of mandatory disclosure on 
fairness to its effects on economic efficiency. Here opinions among 
financial economists have varied.14 Mandatory disclosure's effect on 
efficiency has also been a matter of intense debate among the 
economics-oriented members of the legal academy. As the discussion 
below indicates, the two questions this Article addresses empirically 
- whether an increase in share price accuracy enhances the 
13. This ex ante approach to the question of price fairness is, in our view. the 
appropriate one. The focus is on the point in time at which the investor purchases her share. 
This is the point at which the investor makes the decision that puts her in a position to be 
affected by the future disclosure practices of the issuer. There is a broad consensus that the 
effect of these future disclosure practices on the expected future cash flow to holders of the 
issuer's shares is reflected in the price. See Choi & Guzman, supra note 2, at 925; Fox, 
Disclosure in a Globalizing Market, supra note 12, at 2533-39; Romano, Empowering 
Investors, supra note 2, at 2366-67. From the perspective of the shareholder at the time of 
purchase, the fact that share price is unbiased regardless of the issuer's disclosure practices 
means that the possibility that the investor will end up ex post worse off as a result of the 
issuer's disclosure practices by paying too much for the share is no greater than the 
possibility that she will end up better off ex post by paying too little as a result of these 
practices. It may be that an issuer's disclosure level affects the riskiness of the purchase, but 
which way is a complex question discussed infra in Part II. Moreover, even if for the time 
horizon relevant to the investor the effect of low disclosure is to increase the riskiness of the 
purchase, it would not be appropriate to label that effect "unfair." Since issuer disclosure 
relates only to revelation of firm-specific information (as opposed to information relevant to 
the returns on all issuers in the market), the risk here is unsystematic and can be diversified 
away. This means that it is not even clear that most investors incur any additional risk from a 
low level of issuer disclosure, at least over the longer run. Most investors are at least 
somewhat diversified. See Marshall E. Blume & Irwin Friend, The Asset Structure of 
Individual Portfolios and Some Implications for Utility Functions, 30 J. FIN . 585, 585-87 
(1975) (indicating that, while investors are not as diversified as is often assumed in the 
literature, most investors appear to be at least somewhat diversified). Moreover, casual 
empiricism suggests that many investors are buying and selling in the market over a 
considerable portion of their lifetime. Their ex post losses from paying too much for some 
shares should therefore approximately average out to their ex post gains from paying too 
little for others. As for helping investors who are not diversified, it is probably better public 
policy to engage in an educational campaign urging them to start diversifying than to 
mandate a costly disclosure rule that at best can only protect those who choose not to 
diversify their holdings. 
14. The opening attack on the proposition that there were efficiency benefits from 
mandatory disclosure came in the 1960s in the form of empirical work by economists 
studying the effects of the imposition of the U.S. mandatory disclosure laws in the 1930s. See, 
e.g. , Benston, supra note 2, at 132; Stigler, supra note 2, at 122-24. For a more detailed 
discussion of this work and the work of other economists who come to opposing conclusions, 
see Fox, Retaining Mandatory Disclosure, supra note 6, at 1369-95. Signaling theory - the 
idea that issuers with good news will want to disclose it and that the market will infer from 
the silence of the rest that they do not have good news - added a theoretical component to 
this case against mandatory disclosure. See Steven A. Ross, Disclosure Regulation in 
Financial Markets: Implications of Modern Finance Theory and Signaling Theory, in ISSUES 
IN FINANCIAL REGULATION 177 (Franklin R. Edwards ed., 1979). For a critical review of 
signaling theory with citations to the literature, see Fox, Retaining Mandatory Disclosure, 
supra note 6, at 1369-95; see also infra note 37 and accompanying text. 
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performance of the real economy and whether mandatory disclosure 
increases share price accuracy- are at the center of this debate.'5 
B. Share Price A ccuracy and Economic Efficiency 
Do more accurate share prices enhance economic efficiency? Some 
legal scholars think not and embrace what we call the "irrelevance 
position." Others think the level of share price accuracy is relevant to 
economic efficiency. 
1. The Irrelevance Position 
Some scholars embrace the irrelevance position based on a simple 
application of first principles derived from the widely accepted 
theories forming the foundations of the capital asset pricing model 
("CAPM") and the EMH. These commentators believe that these 
principles can be used to demonstrate the impossibility of more 
informed prices enhancing efficiency.16 The view of these theoretical 
skeptics, including Professors Barbara Banoff and Roberta Romano, 
starts with the proposition that the EMH assures that prices will be 
unbiased and hence fair. They then go on to argue that any 
improvements in share price accuracy resulting from increased 
disclosure affect only firm-specific risk, which can be diversified away. 
Under CAPM, a change in the level of firm-specific risk has no effect 
on the market value of its shares. This is because a security with higher 
firm-specific risk will not be priced in the market to produce a higher 
expected return since there is no need to provide an extra reward to 
induce the holding of risks that can be ·diversified away. These scholars 
15. As noted, the empirical findings presented here suggest, contrary to the positions of 
opponents of mandatory disclosure, that more accurate share prices enhance the 
performance of the real economy and that mandatory disclosure increases share price 
accuracy. A third question remains, however, before the question of the desirability of 
mandatory disclosure can be resolved definitively: are the benefits to the real economy as 
great as the costs of mandatory disclosure? 
Affirmative empirical evidence is lacking for the proposition that the benefits are 
greater than the costs. Affirmative evidence is similarly lacking, however, for the proposition 
that the costs are greater than the benefits. This void is going to be difficult to fill. Given the 
amount of background noise and the limited power of the statistical tests currently available 
to test these propositions, mandatory disclosure would have to have an extraordinarily large 
positive or negative net effect on social welfare for the effect to be detected at a statistically 
significant level. Fox, Retaining Mandatory Disclosure, supra note 6, at 1383-90. Thus, for 
now at least, the answer to this third question is probably going to have to be decided on the 
basis of theory. 
16. Barbara Ann Banoff, Regulatory Subsidies, Efficient Markets, and Shelf Registration: 
An Analysis of Rule 415, 70 VA. L. REV. 135, 176-84 (1984) (claiming that improvements in 
share price accuracy resulting from the underwriter due diligence prompted by the due 
diligence liability defense in Section ll(b) of the 1933 Act are not worthwhile); Roberta 
Romano, The Need for Competition in International Securities Regulation, 2 THEORETICAL 
INQUIRIES L. 387, 482 (2001) [hereinafter Romano, Need for Competition]. 
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thus believe that any improvement in share price accuracy that 
mandatory disclosure may bring about cannot justify its cost, since 
improved share price accuracy will not increase the market value of 
the shares involved. As a result, they oppose mandatory disclosure. 
Other scholars embracing the irrelevance position, including 
Professor Lynn Stout, acknowledge the theoretical argument that 
share price accuracy could enhance economic efficiency by helping to 
better guide capital to the most promising proposed investment 
projects, but dismiss the importance of this effect in the real world.17 
These writers point to the institutional reality that the vast majority of 
new real investment is not funded by public offerings of equity. These 
institutional skeptics believe, therefore, that share prices can have at 
most only a small effect on the functioning of the real economy.18 As a 
result, they believe in the inherent weakness of any argument that 
favors mandatory disclosure based on the real economy efficiency 
effects of improved share price accuracy. 
2. The Relevance Position 
The adherents of the relevance position, among whom we include 
ourselves, believe that the effects of share price accuracy on economic 
efficiency are much more important than do either the theoretical or 
institutional skeptics. 19 The theoretical skeptics seem to take as a given 
the cash flows generated by firms, with equity ownership simply 
representing a method for investors to store wealth and the stock 
market simply providing a facility for the trading of financial assets, 
hedging, diversification, and pooling of risk. In contrast, the relevance 
adherents see the prices established in the stock market as affecting 
the efficiency of the real economy.20 More accurate prices can increase 
17. Lynn A. Stout, The Unimportance of Being Efficient: An Economic Analysis of 
Stock Market Pricing and Securities Regulation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 613, 645-47 (1988); see also 
HOMER KRIPKE, THE SEC AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE 135-39 (1979); Adolf A. Berle, 
Modern Functions of the Corporate System, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 445-47 (1962). 
18. The term "real economy" refers to the production of goods and services in ways that 
provide for present and future consumption. The term "real investment" means investment, 
such as buildings, machinery, or research and development, that enhances the capacity of the 
economy to produce goods and services. Both real economy and real investment are 
distinguished from finance, which relates to the allocation of future cash flows and their 
associated risks. 
19. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory 
Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. REV. 717, 751 (1984) [hereinafter Coffee, Market Failure]; Fox, 
Disclosure in a G/oba/izing Market, supra note 12; Merritt B. Fox, Shelf Registration, 
Integrated Disclosure, and Underwriter Due Diligence: An Economic Analysis, 70 VA. L. 
REV. 1005, 1015-25 (1984); Marcel Kahan, Securities Laws and the Social Costs of 
"Inaccurate" Stock Prices, 41 DUKE L.J. 977 (1992); Paul G. Mahoney, Mandatory Disclosure 
as a Solution to Agency Problems, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1047 (1995). 
20. In ignoring disclosure's effects on the real economy, the theoretical skeptics follow 
the bulk of theoretical literature in the area of economics of disclosure. Most of this 
literature focuses on the effects of disclosure on the efficiency with which securities are 
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the amount of value added by firms as they use society's scarce 
resources for the production of goods and services. In a competitive 
economy, this increase in value added will generally increase both the 
level of firm cash flows, which the theoretical skeptics take as given, 
and returns to other factors of production.21 Greater disclosure and 
share price accuracy perform this function both by improving the 
quality of choice among proposed investment projects in the economy 
and by improving the operation of existing real assets. 
As the relevance adherents see it, improved price accuracy in the 
primary market for shares produces these social benefits directly. 
Greater share price accuracy at a time when an issuer contemplates 
implementing a new project by means of a share offering will bring the 
issuer's cost of capital more in line with the social cost of investing 
society's scarce savings in the contemplated project. As a result, these 
savings are allocated more efficiently, going more to the most 
promising proposed projects in the economy.22 
Improved price accuracy in the secondary market, and the 
disclosure that induces it, create social benefits as well, though less 
directly. Disclosure and more accurate secondary market share prices 
enhance the effectiveness of the social devices that limit the extent to 
which managers of public corporations place their own interests above 
those of their shareholders (the agency costs of management). To 
start, additional disclosure and increased share price accuracy, by 
signaling when there are problems, assist in both the effective exercise 
of the shareholder franchise and shareholder enforcement of 
exchanged in the market. The fact that this is the focus of most disclosure economists might 
appear to give the position of the theoretical skeptics a certain authority, but, in this case, 
appearances are deceiving. In a comprehensive survey article concerning this literature, 
Robert Verrecchia sees the focus on the efficiency with which securities are exchanged as 
reflecting a desire by disclosure economists to take on an intellectual challenge: to show, 
contrary to the earliest articles in the field, that disclosure can promote efficiency even in a 
pure exchange economy. Robert E. Verrecchia, Essays on Disclosure, 32 J. ACCT. & ECON. 
97, 160-164 (2001). Verrecchia states: 
Researchers had long recognized that production militates against all potential debilitating 
effects of disclosure, including adverse risk sharing. Consequently, the path that promoted 
disclosure as a device to yield social value in production and exchange economies was 
deemed insufficiently provocative. Alternatively, paths that promoted a utility for disclosure 
in (exclusively) pure exchange settings remained popular because they appeared to be 
addressing the "disclosure paradox": that is, explaining why it was not the case that more 
disclosure was bad, and not good. 
Id. at 163 (footnotes omitted); see also J. Gregory Kunkel, Sufficient Conditions for Public 
Information to Have Social Value in a Production Economy, 37 J. FIN. 1005 (1982) 
(maintaining that the problem with the early literature showing that disclosure reduced 
efficiency is that it focused solely on the exchange of securities and did not account for the 
disclosure's beneficial effects on the allocation of real resources in the economy). 
21. See Fox, Disclosure in a Globalizing Market, supra note 12, at 2561-69. 
22. See Fox, Retaining Mandatory Disclosure, supra note 6, at 1358-63. 
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management's fiduciary duties.23 Additional disclosure and more 
accurate share prices also increase the threat of hostile takeover when 
managers engage in non-share-value-maximizing behavior. They make 
a takeover less risky for potential acquirers and reduce the chance that 
a value-enhancing acquisition will be deterred by the target having an 
inaccurately high share price.24 
The institutional skeptics accept as a theoretical matter the portion 
of this story concerning the role of accurate share prices in improving 
capital allocation when issuers offer new shares.25 As noted above, 
however, they dismiss the importance of this phenomenon because of 
the relatively small percentage of all capital projects that are funded 
by new issues of shares.26 There are two responses to this. First, the 
institutional skeptics ignore the role that ongoing disclosure and 
improved price accuracy in secondary trading markets play in the 
reduction of the agency costs of management. The reduction in agency 
costs not only improves how existing projects are operated; it also 
improves capital allocations because misuse of most firms' primary 
source of capital funds - internal cash flow - is probably the single 
greatest agency cost of management.27 
23. See Merritt B .  Fox, Required Disclosure and Corporate Governance, LA w & 
CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1999, at 113. This is obvious when disclosures themselves 
suggest the possible existence of such a problem. Signaling also can occur when a share price 
declines, indicating, if the price has a relatively high level of accuracy, that something is 
amiss. 
24. The market for corporate control is a well-recognized device for limiting the agency 
costs of management where ownership is separated from control, as in the typical publicly 
held corporation. More information and the resulting increase in price accuracy improves 
the control market's effectiveness in performing this role. A potential acquirer, in deciding 
whether it is worth the price to acquire a target that the acquirer feels is mismanaged, must 
make an assessment of what the target would be worth in the acquirer's hands. This 
assessment is inherently risky and acquirer management is likely to be risk averse. Greater 
disclosure, however, reduces the riskiness of this assessment. Hence, with greater disclosure, 
a smaller apparent deviation between incumbent management decisionmaking and what 
would maximize share value is needed to impel a potential acquirer into action. 
Additionally, when share price is inaccurately high, even a potential acquirer who is 
certain that it can run the target better than can the incumbent management may find the 
target not worth the cost of acquisition. The increase in share price accuracy that results 
from greater disclosure reduces the chance that a socially worthwhile takeover will be 
thwarted in this fashion. 
Greater disclosure thus makes the hostile takeover threat more real. Incumbent 
managers will be less tempted to implement negative net present value projects in order to 
maintain or enlarge their empires, or to operate existing projects in ways that sacrifice 
profits to satisfy their personal aims. Those that nevertheless act in this manner are more 
likely to be replaced. See MERRITT B. Fox, FINANCE AND INDUSTRIAL PERFORMANCE IN A 
DYNAMIC ECONOMY 84-91 (1987). 
25. Stout, supra note 17, at 643. 
26. Id. at 645-47. 
27. FOX, supra note 24, at 121-50; Michael C. Jensen, The Agency Costs of Free Cash 
Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 323 (1986). 
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Second, more accurate share prices in the secondary market also 
improve capital allocation when the firm uses nonequity external 
sources of capital such as debt offerings or institutional borrowings. 
On the supply side, share price can affect the financial cost of a 
proposed investment project by affecting the terms at which 
intermediaries are willing to extend the firm these alternative forms of 
external financing.28 On the demand side, share price can affect 
management's willingness to use funds to implement a new project. 
Share price can affect management's willingness to use debt financing 
because of the prospect that the firm will subsequently want to 
counterbalance any new debt with new equity financing in order to 
maintain its optimal debt/equity ratio.29 More generally, because of 
concern with public perceptions, low share price can constrain use of 
both external and internal funds.30 Putting these supply and demand 
factors together, if share price is inaccurately low, management may 
decide not to pursue relatively promising proposed investment 
projects, while if it is inaccurately high, management may implement 
relatively unpromising proposed projects. Greater share price 
accuracy limits this problem. 
3. Empirical Studies 
These contending views are based primarily on theory. Until now, 
there has been little empirical evidence brought to bear on the 
question of whether more accurate share prices do or do not in fact 
significantly enhance the efficiency of the real economy. 
C. Mandatory Disclosure and Share Price Accuracy 
Does mandatory disclosure enhance share price accuracy? Some 
legal scholars who oppose mandatory disclosure believe not. Legal 
scholars who favor mandatory disclosure inherently believe that it 
does. 
28. KRIPKE, supra note 17, at 123. 
29. Some financial theorists suggest that there is no optimal debt/equity ratio. For the 
classic statement of this view, see Franco Modigliani & Merton H. Miller, The Cost of 
Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment, 48 AM. ECON. REV. 261 (1958). 
The more orthodox view today is, however, that there are factors weighing against both too 
little debt and too much. Too little debt deprives a firm of its tax-deductible interest 
payments. Too much debt leads to increased agency costs because of the resulting increased 
divergence between the interests of debt and equity. It also increases the likelihood of 
bankruptcy, which would involve real costs. For an overview of these points and the 
responses of the adherents of financial structure irrelevance, see RICHARD A. BREALEY & 
STEWART C. MEYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 447-66 (5th ed. 1996). 
30. See Fox, supra note 24, at 282-87. 
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1. The Ineffectiveness Position 
Scholars such as Professors Jonathan Macey, Roberta Romano, 
Homer Kripke and Ed Kitch maintain that mandatory disclosure is 
relatively ineffective. They believe that most information gets 
incorporated into share prices via other routes - including voluntary 
public disclosure by issuers, selective disclosure by issuers to analysts 
and major investors, insider trading, and independent research by 
analysts and the news media.J1 
The skepticism of these scholars concerning the effectiveness of 
mandatory disclosure comes in substantial part from the belief that, 
compared to the incentives of the private actors involved in these 
other routes, "monopolist" government bureaucrats do not have 
adequate incentives to ask the right questions.J2 The result, the 
argument runs, has been an undue emphasis on historical data, which 
is of much less value in moving share price toward actual value than 
would be management's projections of future cash flows.JJ Moreover, 
the ineffectiveness adherents suggest that most responses to the 
government-mandated questions are. either banal boilerplate or have 
already been revealed voluntarily prior to their appearance in SEC 
filings.J4 In addition, at least one such adherent, Ed Kitch, maintains 
that where the government does ask questions that are both of real 
relevance and the answers to which would not have been produced 
voluntarily, the proper response would typically involve the release of 
proprietary information.J5 In these situations, Kitch argues, issuers 
figure out how to avoid giving meaningful answers.J6 
2. The Effectiveness Position 
Legal scholars who favor mandatory disclosure generally argue 
that, in the absence of regulation, the existence of externalities will 
result in a market failure whereby too little information will be 
31. Macey, supra note 2, at 928; Romano, Empowering Investors, supra note 2, at 2373-
80; Romano, Need for Competition, supra note 16, at 446-64. 
32. Romano, Empowering Investors, supra note 2, at 2374, 2378-80. Some economists 
share this view. See Ross L. WATTS & JEROLD L. ZIMMERMAN, POSITIVE ACCOUNTING 
THEORY 173-76 (1986) (stating that disclosure regulators act to maximize their own 
interests). 
33. Homer Kripke, The SEC, the Accountants, Some Myths and Some Realities, 45 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 151, 1 197-1201 (1970). 
34. Romano, Need for Competition, supra note 16, at 458. 
35. Edmund W. Kitch, The Theory and Practice of Securities Disclosure, 61 BROOK. L. 
REV. 763, 846-57 (1995). 
36. Id. 
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incorporated into share prices.37 Implicit in this position is the belief 
that mandatory disclosure results in meaningful issuer disclosures that 
would otherwise not be forthcoming and that these disclosures add to 
share price accuracy. 
The ineffectiveness adherents' complaint concerning mandated 
disclosure's emphasis on historical data, rather than on management 
projections, has a "glass is half empty" quality. While access to 
management's particular view of the future is useful, no one -
management or outsider - can predict the future except on the basis 
of facts concerning the world past and present. SEC-mandated 
historical data provides significant raw material for this kind of 
analysis. The complaint that much SEC-induced disclosure appears to 
be boilerplate overlooks the important information that is revealed by 
a minority of issuers when answering the same questions that result in 
banal, boilerplate answers by the majority of issuers. The minority is 
prompted to provide significant detail because for them, unlike for the 
majority, a banal answer alone would be misleading without more 
disclosure.38 As to the ineffectiveness adherents' complaint that much 
of what does appear to be significant in SEC-induced disclosures has 
been previously revealed to the public voluntarily by issuers, the 
effectiveness adherents reply that these earlier "voluntary" disclosures 
may well have occurred only because the issuer knew that it would be 
required to reveal the information in an SEC filing anyway and 
decided that it might as well get credit for disclosing the information 
sooner.39 Furthermore, without this SEC requirement, the earlier 
announcement, if it occurred at all, might well not have been as full or 
as accurate. 
These rebuttals to the arguments of the ineffectiveness adherents 
have merit. We nevertheless recognize that behind this debate among 
37. See, e.g. , Lucian A. Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits 
on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435, 1490-91 (1992); Coffee, 
Market Failure, supra note 19; Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory 
Disclosure and the Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 673-77 (1984); Fox, Issuer 
Choice, supra note 6, at 569-98; Fox, Retaining Mandatory Disclosure, supra note 6, at 1346. 
Many economics of disclosure theorists use models in which management discloses less 
because of concerns that disclosure can hurt their firms' competitive positions. For surveys 
of these models, see Verrecchia, supra note 20, at 141-60, and Healy & Palepu, supra note 6, 
at 424-25. There is some empirical evidence supporting this theoretical proposition. Joseph 
Piotroski finds that a firm is more likely to add financial reporting about one of its individual 
business segments where it has declining profitability (a condition suggesting that the issuer 
will suffer less from competitors and potential competitors learning of the issuer's segment 
profits) or less variability in profitability among its business segments (a condition suggesting 
that providing only company-wide financial reporting obscures less so that the competitive 
harm from providing segment reporting is less). Joseph David Piotroski, The Impact of 
Discretionary Segment Reporting Behavior on Investor Beliefs and Stock Prices 5-47 (1999) 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan) (on file with author). 
38. Fox, Issuer Choice, supra note 6, at 594. 
39. Id. at 595. 
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legal scholars, there is a complex theoretical debate in economics 
concerning the contribution, if any, of mandatory disclosure to 
enhancing share price accuracy. The literature constituting this 
theoretical debate, discussed briefly below,40 focuses on the economic 
incentives to gather, share, and trade on information in a world where 
there is also, depending on the particular study, voluntary public 
disclosure, selective disclosure by issuers to analysts and major 
investors, insider trading, or independent research by analysts and 
news media. To us, the contradictory conclusions of the different 
theoretical studies concerning the effectiveness of public disclosure in 
general, or mandatory public disclosure in particular, often seem to be 
artifacts of the particular assumptions that the authors of the 
respective studies employ. Ultimately, the issue of the effectiveness of 
mandatory disclosure is one that can only be settled empirically. The 
study set out in Part IV concerning the enhanced MD&A 
requirements is a contribution to this empirical effort and suggests 
that mandatory disclosure can effectively enhance share price 
accuracy. 
II. SHARE PRICE ACCURACY, SHARE PRICE INFORMEDNESS, AND 
THE R2METHODOLOGY 
Before we can talk about whether more accurate share prices lead 
to greater economic efficiency and whether mandatory disclosure 
leads to more accurate share prices, we need to discuss with greater 
precision what it means to say that prices are more accurate. We then 
need to relate the concept of share price accuracy, which is the term 
that has traditionally been used in the debate concerning the 
relationship between the quality of share prices and economic 
efficiency, to the closely related, newer concept of share price 
informedness. We also need to discuss R2, our empirical measure of 
share price accuracy. 
A. Share Price Accuracy 
The concept of share price accuracy relates to how good a share's 
price is as a predictor of the future cash flows (dividends and any other 
distributions) that will be received by whoever holds the share over 
the rest of the life of the issuing firm. The roles that share prices can 
play in the functioning of the real economy relate to their capacity to 
signal which firms' proposed investment projects promise the highest 
returns and which firms' managers are doing a good job at operating 
40. See infra Part Il.A.2.b. 
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existing facilities. The better share prices predict future firm cash 
flows, the better they perform these roles. 
1. Precise Definitions of "Actual Value" and "Share Price Accuracy" 
The first step in understanding share price accuracy is to define a 
share's "actual value," which at any point in time is the aggregate 
future stream of income - dividends and other distributions - paid 
out from then on to whoever holds the share over the lifetime of the 
firm (discounted to present value). This definition requires an ex post 
view to be operative. The actual value of a share at t0, a point during 
the ongoing life of the firm, cannot be determined until the moment of 
the firm's liquidation, t,iq' The moment of liquidation is the end of the 
firm's life, by which time the issuer has paid out its last distribution. 
Until t,iq• the amounts, if any, of the remaining distribution or 
distributions are uncertain. Thus, at t0, which is prior to t,iq• even the 
best informed real-world investor can only make an estimate of the 
share's actual value. 
What can we say about the relationship at t0 between the market 
price of a publicly traded share and its actual value? As noted earlier, 
the EMH suggests that the market price of a share at t0 is an unbiased 
estimate of the share's actual value at t0•41 In other words, the price at 
t0 is equally likely to ultimately turn out to have been below the 
share's actual value at t0 as it is to have been above it. By itself, 
however, the conclusion that a share price is unbiased says nothing 
about how close the price is likely to be - one way or the other - to 
actual value. Share price is relatively "accurate" if it is likely to be 
relatively close, whether above or below, to the share's actual value.42 
41. There is a large body of financial economics literature evaluating market reactions 
to affirmative public announcements of various kinds of events affecting particular issuers. 
For a classic review, see KENNETH GARBADE, SECURITIES MARKETS 249-59 (1982). An 
"event study" involves a large number of issuers, each of which has experienced at one time 
or another the announcement of a particular kind of event, for example a stock split. The 
typical study shows that the shares of the affected firms as a group experience statistically 
significant abnormal returns at the time of the announcement, and, starting almost 
immediately thereafter, normal returns for the duration of the study, which is sometimes as 
long as several years. Thus, while some issuers' share prices go up in the periods following 
the immediate reaction to the announcement and others go down (each compared with the 
market as a whole), the average change is near zero. Assuming that longer-term prices are 
themselves unbiased measures of actual value, the results of the studies are thus consistent 
with the concept that the market's evaluation of the significance of the event on the actual 
value of each issuer's shares, while it may sometimes have been too high and sometimes too 
low, was unbiased. 
42. Put in statistical terms, price can be considered a random variable generated by a 
distribution function that, because price is unbiased, has a mean equal to the share's actual 
value and a variance that can be considered a measure of the expected accuracy of the price. 
Throughout this article, when we refer to price accuracy, we are referring to this concept of 
expected price accuracy. 
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When a price has a high expected accuracy, the deviation of the price 
from actual value is, on average, relatively small. 
2. The Core Determinants of Share Price Accuracy: The Existence of 
Information and Its Reflection in Price 
Share price accuracy is a function of two core determinants. One is 
the amount of information concerning a firm's future distributions that 
exists in the hands of one or more persons in the world. The other is 
the extent to which price reflects this information. A number of 
considerations influence these two core determinants of share price 
accuracy. 
a. L ength of time before liquidation. The closer in time an issuer is 
to its liquidation, the more accurate, everything else being equal, is its 
share price. This proposition becomes obvious by looking at an 
issuer's share price when the issuer is taking its last breaths 
immediately prior to liquidation (i.e., when t0 is at a moment 
immediately prior to t1iq) .  The market price is likely to be very close to 
the amount of the liquidating distribution paid to the holder of each of 
its shares (whether zero or some positive amount). This is because of 
the way both determinants of share price accuracy work at this point. 
As for the amount of information, it is relatively easy for at least some 
people to be highly informed concerning the size of the final 
distribution. This information is then very likely to become fully, or 
nearly fully, reflected in price, either through public disclosure of what 
the liquidating distribution will be, or, unless prevented by effective 
rules imposed by the legal system or norm structure applicable to the 
holders of the information, through trading by insiders or others 
informed via tipping or selective disclosure.43 
b. Economic and legal incentives to gather, share, and trade on 
information and their interaction. When a possible cash distribution by 
an issuer to its shareholders is further in the future, share price 
accuracy is affected by the fact that it inherently becomes increasingly 
difficult for persons to gather and analyze information about the 
factors determining the amount of the distribution. How much 
information is in fact gathered and analyzed by anyone depends both 
on the economic incentives to do so, and, to the extent they exist, on 
laws that effectively require such collection and analysis (such as a rule 
requiring a public company to undergo an audit certified by an 
independent accountant). The extent to which such information is 
then reflected in price depends on the economic and legal incentives, 
43. Because the information provides a near-certain prediction of the amount of the 
distribution, the economic risk associated with trading on the information is very low. 
Absent effective legal or normative restraints on such trading, the volume of trades by 
insiders, tipees, and selective disclosure recipients is therefore likely to be high. 
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both positive and negative, for persons who have gathered and 
analyzed such information to disclose it to others (publicly or 
selectively). It also depends on the economic and legal incentives, both 
positive and negative, of anyone possessing such information 
whether a generator or a receiver - to trade on it. 
Assessing the effect of existing economic and legal incentives on 
price accuracy is made more complex by the fact that there is an 
interaction between the considerations determining how much 
information is gathered and analyzed and the considerations 
determining how much of what is gathered and analyzed gets reflected 
in price. On the one hand, the opportunity to trade on information 
that is not required to be disclosed to others creates incentives to 
gather and analyze such information. On the other hand, the more 
widely held information is by persons who can trade on it, the more 
likely it is to be reflected in price.44 Moreover, when someone receives, 
whether by selective or public disclosure, information gathered by 
someone else, the recipient may find it more worthwhile herself to 
gather and analyze yet additional information. This is because the 
information that is received may constitute a valuable input to the 
process of further discovery. Thus, for example, it may be more 
worthwhile for an investor to gather and analyze information (not yet 
gathered and analyzed by others) concerning the market for the 
product of an issuer that has disclosed basic financial information 
about itself, than to gather and analyze information concerning the 
market for the product of a firm that has not engaged in such 
44. See Eugene F. Fama, Random Walks in Stock Market Prices, FIN. ANALYSTS J. ,  
Sept.-Oct. 1965, at 55 (describing how information is incorporated into price); Ronald J. 
Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 
568-69 (1984). The simplest models of price formation suggest that price is the product of the 
weighted average of expectations of all investors. See, e.g., John Lintner, The Aggregation of 
Investor's Diverse Judgments and Preferences in a Purely Competitive Economy, 4 J. FIN. & 
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 347, 348 (1969). This would mean that the trading of a small 
number of arbitrageurs acting on a piece of information could not by itself move price 
sufficiently to fully reflect the import of the piece of information. Indeed, contrary to the 
EMH, in such a model, the price would not fully reflect the information until all active 
investors knew the information. Fox, supra note 24, at 36-43 (demonstrating the inadequacy 
of arbitrage to fully correct prices due to the risk that purchases or short sales of arbitraged 
shares add to an arbitrageur's portfolio because of the dediversification they involve). More 
sophisticated models recognize that investors are aware that price may reflect information 
known by other investors. Hence price is not just a constraint, it can affect investors' demand 
for securities and, as a result, information known by only some traders can influence price as 
if more investors knew it. Sanford Grossman, On the Efficiency of Competitive Stock 
Markets Where Investors Have Diverse Information, 31 J. FIN. 573, 573-74 (1976). This is not 
a complete substitute for broader distribution of the information, however, because the 
existence of noise - other things affecting price - makes it impossible for investors not 
possessing the information to "decode" share price so effectively that they are in the same 
position as if they knew the information themselves. Sanford J. Grossman & Joseph E.  
Stiglitz, On the Impossibility of Informationally Ef icient Markets, 70 AM.  ECON. REV. 393, 
394-95 (1980). 
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disclosure.45 In addition, when a small number of people are able to 
trade regularly on relatively precise material information, it becomes 
less profitable for persons outside that circle to gather and analyze 
information for trading purposes.46 The complexities of these 
interactions are what make it difficult to determine at a theoretical 
level whether share price accuracy is enhanced or diminished by any 
of the standard tools of securities regulation such as insider trading 
regulation, the regulation of selective disclosure, or - our concern 
here - mandatory disclosure. 
3. "Speculative Noise" Versus "Fundamental Information" 
Share price accuracy will be diminished if the price is affected by 
what financial economists refer to as "speculative noise."  The model 
of share pricing described so far excludes this kind of noise. It assumes 
that whatever information share prices do reflect, it is of a kind that 
will help in predicting future distributions more precisely, i .e., it is 
"fundamental information."  Thus the model implicitly assumes that 
the arbitrage activities of "smart money" speculators, who focus 
exclusively on future distributions, fully counteract any trading by 
"nai've" speculators, whose trading is activated by fads, fashions, or 
45. There are good theoretical reasons for thinking this to be true. The discovery of 
information not yet discovered by others and hence not reflected in market price is likely to 
hold the promise of greater arbitrage profits in the case of a firm that has disclosed basic 
financial information about itself than in the case of one that has not. The firm that has not 
disclosed the basic financial information is likely to have, for the relevant time period, more 
risk associated with it than does the firm that has disclosed this information. The risk is firm 
specific, though, and so it will not affect the riskiness of a fully diversified portfolio. Each 
purchase, based on the difference between current price and what is indicated by the newly 
discovered information, is, however, an inherently dediverisfying transaction. Taking on an 
additional share of the firm that has not disclosed will add more to the riskiness of the 
investor's portfolio than taking on an additional share of the issuer that has disclosed. Thus, 
compared with the firm that has disclosed, fewer shares of the firm that has not disclosed will 
be added to the investor's portfolio before the additional arbitrage gain from purchasing an 
additional share is not worth the added risk. See Fox, supra note 24, at 36-43. This prospect 
of smaller arbitrage profits will reduce the incentive to gather and analyze information about 
the firm that does not disclose. More generally, John Coffee has made the argument that 
mandatory disclosure constitutes a subsidy to the investment-analyst industry that increases 
the amount of analyst activity. Coffee, supra note 19, at 728-29. Coffee's point is consistent 
with the theoretical point made by Grossman and Stiglitz that if the cost of gathering and 
analyzing private information is lower (which it would be with more free, publicly available 
information to use as feedstock for research) there will be a higher intensity of trading by the 
smart money speculators, which will lead to more informed prices. Grossman & Stiglitz, 
supra note 44, at 405. There is some empirical support for the theory that more disclosure 
leads to more gathering and analysis of yet additional information. Lang and Lundholm find 
that a firm that discloses more is followed by more analysts and that the analysts' forecasts 
are more accurate. Mark Lang & Russell Lundholm, Cross Sectional Determinants of 
Analyst Ratings of Corporate Disclosure, 31 J. ACCT. RES. 246 (1993). 
46. Michael J. Fishman & Kathleen M. Hagerty, Insider Trading and the Efficiency of 
Stock Prices, 23 RAND J. ECON. 106, 1 10 (1992); Zahar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, 
On Insider Trading, Markets, and "Negative" Property Rights in Information, 87 VA. L. REV. 
1229, 1238-43 (2001). 
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irrational psychological predispositions toward behaviors such as 
chasing trends. Many financial economists (including ourselves), 
believe, however, that the arbitrage activities of the smart money 
speculators ("risk arbitrageurs") do not always fully counteract the 
actions of these naive speculators. As a result, share prices will be 
further from actual value than they would have been absent the 
trading by the nai"ve speculators, the difference being speculative 
noise.47 The more speculative noise in the market, the less accurate are 
share prices. 
There are reasons to believe that if less fundamental information is 
gathered and reflected in share price, the attention of speculative 
traders will turn more in the direction of speculative noise. If, relative 
to fundamental information, this noise plays a larger role in 
determining future share prices, speculators will get more reward for 
trying to figure out future noise and less reward for trying to figure out 
future cash distributions to shareholders.48 This reward structure 
makes the effort to design social institutions that encourage the 
gathering and analyzing of fundamental information and its reflection 
47. See. e.g., Fisher Black, Noise, 41 J. FIN. 529 (1986). Speculative noise can occur in the 
view of these economists, even if there are smart money speculators in the market who trade 
knowing a stock's fundamental value. Fundamental value is the price that would prevail if 
the market consisted entirely of rational investors who possessed all available information 
(i.e., the price that would prevail in a truly efficient market). The smart money speculators 
are limited in their ability to arbitrage away the difference between what the share's market 
price would be based on the trades of the noise traders and the share's fundamental value. 
To start, unless the smart money speculators have an infinite time horizon, the uncertainty 
created by the possibility of continued noise trading makes taking such a position inherently 
risky even if the smart money speculators know for certain a stock's actual value. This is 
because they know at the time they are contemplating a purchase that because of noise, 
price at the end of their time horizon may still deviate from actual value. J. Bradford De 
Long et al., Noise Trader Risk in Financial Markets, 98 J. POL. ECON. 703 (1990). 
Furthermore, smart money speculators in fact do not know a stock's actual value with 
certainty, they only know its fundamental value, which is the value implied by the available 
fundamental information. Thus, fundamental value is just a more accurate guess concerning 
actual value than is the noise-trade-influenced market price. This uncertainty as to the 
stock's actual value adds to the smart money speculators' risk of arbitrage. See Andrei 
Schliefer & Lawrence Summers, The Noise Trader Approach to Finance, 4 J. ECON. PERSP. 
19 (1990); see also Fox, supra note 24, at 36-43, 55-59. It should also be noted that the very 
fact that gathering and analyzing information privately is costly means that despite the 
existence of smart-money speculators, space exists for noise trading to occur. This is because 
of the "efficient-market paradox" noted by Grossman and Stiglitz, who observe that 
"because [acquiring private] information is costly, prices cannot perfectly reflect the 
information which is available, since if it did, those who spent resources to obtain it would 
receive no compensation." Grossman & Stiglitz, supra note 44, at 405. An excellent survey in 
the legal literature of the work of the noise theorists, together with an analysis of its legal 
implications, is found in Donald Langevoort, Theories, Assumptions, and Securities 
Regulation: Market Efficiency Revisited, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 851 (1992). 
48. JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST 
AND MONEY 157 (1936). Grossman and Stiglitz make the inverse of this point, suggesting 
that if the cost of gathering and analyzing private information is lower, there will be a higher 
intensity of trading by the smart money speculators, which will lead to "more informative 
pricing." Grossman & Stiglitz, supra note 44, at 404. 
350 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 102:331 
in price doubly important in terms of share price accuracy. 
Accordingly, it makes the determination of the effectiveness of 
mandatory disclosure that much more important. 
B. Share Price Informedness 
1 .  The Concept 
"Share price informedness" is closely related to share price 
accuracy. A share price is more informed at a given time if it reflects a 
larger portion of all the fundamental information known, or, through 
sufficient effort, knowable, by one or more persons in the world. Thus, 
a fully informed price would reflect all knowable information at a 
given point in time. Any fact that is at a given time unknowable will by 
definition unpredictably (i.e., randomly) affect future shareholder 
distributions. Because of this, a fully informed price, while not 
perfectly accurate, would be both unbiased and the most accurate 
price possible at the time. Therefore, all of the factors discussed above 
that make a share price more accurate make it more informed as 
well.49 
While the concept of share price accuracy allows a simpler, more 
direct story concerning the relationship between share prices and the 
real economy, the concept of share price informedness serves two 
useful functions in fully understanding this relationship. First, it avoids 
the discomfort that some may feel about the deterministic nature of 
the model behind the concept of share price accuracy. More 
importantly, as will become clear when we discuss immediately below 
the use of the R2 methodology to measure share price accuracy, the 
concept of price informedness highlights the fact that price movement 
can be a sign of share price accuracy rather than inaccuracy. This is 
49. Share price accuracy and informedness can be pictured as follows. Consider an 
analogy between the process by which bits of information are incorporated into share price 
and sampling from a large urn containing one thousand balls. Assume that somewhere 
between zero and .:me thousand of the balls are red and the rest are green. Prior to any 
sampling of the urn, nothing is known about the ratio of red to green balls in the urn. A 
share's actual value is analogous to the actual ratio of the red to green balls. A random 
sample of the urn's balls is equivalent to the bits of information that are incorporated in 
price. Even a small sample of balls provides an unbiased estimate of the actual ratio of red to 
green balls. Similarly, in an efficient market, share price is an unbiased estimate of a share's 
actual value even if there is not a great deal of information available. The impact on the 
estimate of drawing another ball from the urn is unknowable - it could increase or decrease 
the estimate of the actual ratio - but the more balls that are drawn from the urn - i.e., the 
larger the sample - the greater the expected accuracy of the estimate. Similarly, the impact 
of a new bit of information on share price is unknowable prior to its availability - it could 
increase or decrease price - but its incorporation in price will increase the price's expected 
accuracy as an estimate of the share's actual value. The ratio of red to green balls in the 
largest sample possible at any point in time will provide the most accurate possible estimate 
of the actual ratio in the urn. Similarly, a fully informed price at a given point in time is the 
most accurate estimate possible at that time of the actual value of the share. 
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because price movement may indicate, at least in part, an ongoing 
process by which new fundamental infonaation is being reflected in 
price. 
2. Relationship of Share Price Accuracy to Price Movement 
In essence, there are two countervailing considerations at work in 
terms of the relationship between price accuracy and price movement. 
This can be seen most easily in the case of a firm that in its lifetime 
makes only a single distribution, at the time of its liquidation, although 
the points made here are generalizable to a firm that makes multiple 
distributions over time. The first force relates to the expectation 
discussed above, that, for all issuers, the deviation between share price 
and actual value will tend to decrease as the length of time before final 
distribution decreases.50 Taking account of just this first consideration, 
at any given point in time relative to the moment of final distribution, 
the more accurate the price is, the less share price movement we 
would expect to see thereafter as price eventually approaches actual 
value. This is because where the price is more accurate, it is already 
closer to actual value and hence has less further distance to travel. 
Consequently, if only this consideration were at work, where we 
observe over a period of time relatively little movement in the price of 
an issuer's shares, we would assume that on average its share price 
would be more accurate than the share price of an issuer displaying 
more movement. 
The second consideration is the amount of new information 
relevant to an issuer's future cash distributions that on an ongoing 
basis is being gathered, analyzed, and reflected in price. This second 
consideration can potentially work in the other direction. Just taking 
account of the second consideration, more movement may suggest 
greater accuracy. Consider firms A and B. Assume that A and B will 
each make a single distribution of the same amount, at liquidation, on 
the same date sometime in the future. At any point in time, therefore, 
the shares of the two firms have the same actual value. To control for 
the first consideration, assume that at the beginning of the period of 
observation, the prices of A's and B 's shares are equally distant from 
the shares' actual values. After this, substantial amounts of new 
information about firm A are, on an ongoing basis, being gathered, 
analyzed and reflected in its share price. Each newly arriving bit of 
information will on average move price closer to actual value but will, 
as appears to be the case in the real world, include a significant 
amount of random noise.51 Thus, bit by bit, price may move one way 
50. See supra Part 11.A.2.a. 
51. The random noise being referred to here is not the speculative noise referred to in 
Part 11.A.3, supra. It simply reflects the idea that any new piece of information is not perfect. 
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or the other, but the total effect of the cumulating bits will on average 
be moving A's price closer and closer toward the share's actual value. 
Less of this updating is occurring with respect to firm B. We would 
expect firm A to have, during the period of observation, a more 
informed, and hence more accurate, price than firm B because the 
updating information is on average moving its share price closer to 
actual value. If the random-noise element of each bit is sufficiently 
large, however, A's share price will display more price movement on 
average than B's, since new bits of information arrive more frequently, 
and with the arrival of each new bit comes random noise that causes 
price movement.52 So, where there is a significant random-noise 
While, on an expected basis, each bit of information moves price toward actual value, it 
contains a random element that in any given case may move price in the opposite direction. 
In terms of the analogy in note 49, supra, comparing the incorporation of information into 
securities prices with sampling from an urn containing one thousand red and green balls in 
an undetermined proportion, the new bit of information is like a collection of balls some of 
which are from the urn and the rest of which are randomly added from a side collection 
which is half red balls and half green balls. The person doing the sampling knows the 
average number of balls drawn from the side collection but no more. Each sample adds to 
the accuracy of the estimate of the ratio of red to green balls in the urn despite the noise 
from the balls drawn from the side collection. 
52. Consider the following example to demonstrate the plausibility of the proposition 
that firm A, whose price is more frequently updated by new information than firm B's, will 
have on average a more accurate price but will have price changes displaying a greater 
variance than do firm B's price changes. Suppose that firms A and B will each pay out a 
single shareholder distribution, which will occur at liquidation. Both will liquidate at t,. and 
each will pay out $10 per share at that time. Assuming for simplicity a discount rate of zero 
(i.e., pricing is in accordance with CAPM and there is no time value of money or systematic 
risk), each firm's shares will have an actual value of $10 throughout the life of the firm. 
Suppose also that at t0 a share of each firm's stock has a price of $15 and so each starts out 
with an equally inaccurate price. 
Firm A's price is updated in each of the five periods by a new bit of information. The bit 
of new information in each of periods t" t,. t, and t, contains two elements. One element is 
like an accurate missing piece in the puzzle and moves the price $1 closer toward actual 
value. The other element is noise: it is random and has an expected value of 0. Investors can 
only observe the aggregate implications of the two elements combined. Thus, on an expected 
basis, A's price becomes more accurate after the receipt of each bit of information, but the 
observable aggregate implication of the bit involves variation around what would be implied 
by the accurate-piece-of-the-puzzle element alone. The bit of new information at t, is the 
announcement of the liquidating distribution. The price at t, is therefore $10 and is perfectly 
accurate. This model, in which new information, on the one hand, helps to bring price 
toward actual value but, on the other hand, is less than perfect, follows in the tradition of 
R.W. Holthausen & R.E. Verrecchia, The Effect of Sequential Information Releases on the 
Variance of Price Changes in an Intertemporal Multi-Asset Market, 26 J. ACCT. RES. 82 
(1988), and K.R. Subramanyam, Uncertain Precision and Price Reactions to Information, 71 
Acer. REV. 207 (1996). 
Firm B's price is not updated at all until t, but, for it too, the bit of information at t, is the 
announcement of the liquidating distribution. Its price at t, is therefore also a perfectly 
accurate $10. 
The following prices provide an example consistent with this story. Firm A has a price at 
t0 of $15. At t , ,  the price is $12.50 (the result of a noise element of -$1.50, which, when 
combined with the accurate-piece-of-the-picture element, moves the price in aggregate down 
by 2.50). At t,. the price is $14.50 (the result of a noise element of +$3.00, which, when 
combined with the accurate-piece-of-the-picture element, moves the price in aggregate up by 
$2.00). At t,, the price is $10.50 (the result of a noise element of -$3.00, which, when 
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combined with the accurate-piece-of-the-picture element, moves the price in aggregate down 
by $4.00). At t,, the price is $11 .00 (the result of a noise element of +$1.50, which, when 
combined with accurate piece of the picture element, moves the price in aggregate up by 
$.50). At t,, the price equals the share's actual value of $10 (the result of the noiseless 
announcement of the liquidating distribution, providing the last missing piece of the picture). 
Thus the noise element in this example has a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 2.37. 
Firm B's price stays at $15 for periods t,, t,, t, and t, and drops to $10 in period t,, when the 
liquidating dividend is announced. The paths of the share prices of A and B are depicted in 
Figures 1 and 2 below. 
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As shown in Table I below, firm A's price changes display a greater variance than firm 
B 's (5.5 versus 5.0) even though firm A's share price is on average closer to its actual value 
of $10 - i.e., more accurate - than firm B's share price. This greater accuracy can be 
observed simply from looking at Figures 1 and 2. A more precise measure of average share 
price accuracy would be the average of the squared deviations of share price from actual 
value in periods t,, t,, t,, t,,, and t, (the smaller the figure, the more accurate the price). As 
shown in Table I below, the average of these squared deviations for firm A is 5.55 and for 
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element to new information, taking account of just this second 
consideration, the more accurate the share price is at a given time, the 
more share price movement we would expect 
to see. 
Firm B 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Accurate 
-piece-of- Square Square of 
the- Random of deviation of 
puzzle -noise Total price price from actual 
element element effect Price change value of $10 
to 15 
t, 0 0 0 15 0 25 
t2 0 0 0 15 0 25 
t, 0 0 0 15 0 25 
t. 0 0 0 15 0 25 
t, -5 0 -5 10 25 0 
Total -5 0 -5 25 100 
Variance or average square of deviation 5 20 
This example is generalizable to ongoing firms not facing immediate liquidation. 
Specifically, the result that firm A will have on average a more accurate share price and will 
display a higher price variance is replicable under the following changed assumptions. 
Imagine a five period cycle in which once every fifth time period the prices of firm A and B 
are equally accurate. Firm A is updated every period. Firm B is updated only every fifth 
period, but with a bigger piece of information so that, after the updating, its price is for the 
moment as accurate as firm A's. The example above now illustrates one such cycle with each 
firm starting at an equally inaccurate $15 at t0 and each ending up at an equally more 
accurate $10 in t,, but with firm A making adjustments along the way. The same calculations 
as in the example above show that in this case too, firm A has on average greater share price 
accuracy and greater price variance. 
We are not claiming that more frequent updating inevitably results in the combination of 
greater share price variance and greater share price accuracy. Whether or not it does 
depends on the amount of noise in the updating bits of information. The example only 
illustrates that greater share price accuracy can plausibly be accompanied by greater share 
price variance. There are other possibilities as well. If the random-noise element is 
sufficiently small, firm A could, compared with firm B, have a combination of smaller price 
variance and greater share price accuracy. If the random-noise element is sufficiently large, 
firm A could, compared with firm B, have a combination of larger price variance and less 
share price accuracy. It is an empirical question whether the example in fact illustrates the 
typical situation. Studies discussed below in Part 11.C suggest, however, that the example is 
typical, which means that where we observe greater variance, prices are more accurate. 
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In the real world, both considerations are at work. The first 
consideration is working so that greater price movement suggests less 
share price accuracy and the second is working,, at least if information 
bits contain sufficient noise, so that greater price movement suggests 
greater share price accuracy. We can say as a theoretical matter that 
the second consideration would be more important relative to the first 
in the case of relatively short-term (e.g., day-to-day or week-to-week) 
price changes compared to longer-term (quarter-to-quarter, year-to­
year, or decade-to-decade) price changes, because with the longer­
term price changes the noise elements of the day-to-day updates tend 
to cancel each other out. But this observation does not tell us, for any 
given term's price changes, which consideration predominates. 
Whether greater price movement indicates greater or lesser price 
accuracy is ultimately an empirical question. We will discuss 
immediately below strong empirical support for the conclusion that in 
the case of relatively short-term price changes, more movement 
indicates greater share price accuracy.53 
C. The R2 Methodology 
1 .  Overview 
The methodology that we use to determine the informedness of 
share prices and hence their accuracy involves a measure, which we 
call R , of the extent to which share prices of an economy's issuers 
move together.54 For the reasons discussed below, R2 appears to be a 
good inverse proxy for how much fundamental information 
concerning future shareholder distributions is impounded in share 
prices: the lower the R2, the more accurate the 
share price. 
2. Indirect Evidence That R2 Is a Good Inverse Proxy for Share Price 
Accuracy 
The idea that R2 is a good inverse proxy for share price accuracy 
initially arose from the observation by Morck, Yeung, and Yu 
("MYY") that countries vary a great deal in the extent to which share 
prices of their firms tend to move together, the phenomenon 
53. See infra Parts Il .C.2-3. 
54. The R' measure for an individual country is computed as follows. For each 
individual issuer j in the country, run a regression using time series data on the issuer's share 
rate of return whereby r;.. = P;.o + P;.mrm_. + P;jr;,. + E; ... with rm = market return; r; = industry 
retµrn. Then ,decompose the total variance <Qf the issuer's return as follows: 
u ' = u m  + u , . R' for firm j is then defined as (o-; + ,,-;i . R' for the country is an average of 
the R's for its individual issuers, weighted by the total variation of each stock's return. From 
this formula, one can see that there is more firm-specific variation when R' is low. 
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measured by R2•55 This difference among countries is shown 
dramatically in Figure 3. For example, for most weeks during the first 
half of 1995, in each of China, Malaysia, and Poland, over 80% of 
stocks moved in the same direction; for the same period in each of 
Denmark, Ireland, and the United States, there was not a single week 
in which as many as 58 % of firms moved in the same direction 
(despite, in the case of the United States, the then ongoing bull 
market).56 These startling differences cry out for explanation. 
55. Randall Morck et al., The Information Content of Stock Markets: Why Do Emerging 
Markets Have Synchronous Stock Price Movements?, 58 J. FIN. ECON. 215, 217-19 (2000). 
56. Id. Data from other periods in the 1990s behave similarly. Id. 
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Figure 3 
Average Fraction of Firm-Level Return Variation 
Explained By Market Indexes 
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a. The link between R2, poor quality government, and risk arbitrage 
MYY try to explain these national differences by exploring the 
factors that seem to be associated with low and high R2 scores. They 
observe, as illustrated in Figure 3, that developed countries, with high 
per capita GDP, tend to have low R2s, and emerging countries, with 
low per capita GDP, tend to have high R2s. There is no obvious reason 
why low per capita GDP would lead directly to a greater tendency for 
360 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 102:331 
share prices to move together. More likely, MYY reason, low per 
capita GDP is associated with other national characteristics that lead 
to this result.57 MYY try to identify what these other characteristics 
might be, and in the process find evidence that R2 is a good inverse 
proxy for how much fundamental information is impounded in share 
prices. 
MYY first consider a number of obvious structural characteristics 
that appear likely, a priori, to affect a country's R2•58 One is country 
size.59 Firms in a small country might be more uniformly subject to 
environmental influences such as bad weather or nearby geopolitical 
instability. Small countries also tend to have more uniform factor 
endowments, making their overall economies more sensitive to 
changes in relative factor prices such as the price of oil. A second 
structural characteristic is the extent of the diversity of a country's 
firms across industries: the less the diversity of the industries, the more 
likely that the fortunes of all firms will move together.60 A third 
structural characteristic, which serves as a kind of catchall, is the 
extent to which the earnings of a country's firms tend to move 
together.61 
MYY run a regression with a log transformation of country R2s as 
the dependent variable (the variable to be explained) and with per 
capita GDP and measures of each of these three structural 
characteristics as the independent variables (the variables that 
potentially explain the dependent variable) . The coefficient for per 
capita GDP remains statistically significant. Continuing with the 
proposition that there is no reason why low per capita GDP would 
lead directly to share prices moving together, the continued 
significance of the per capita GDP coefficient suggests it is a proxy for 
yet additional country characteristics, institutional rather than 
structural, that help explain the variation in R2•62 MYY add to the 
regression one additional independent variable, a measure for "good 
government. "63 This measure consists of the sum of the scores for each 
country on indexes created by La Porta et al. 64 relating to government 
corruption, risk of government expropriation, and risk of 
governmental contract repudiation. With the addition of this factor, 
57. Id. at 227-28. 
58. Id. at 230-41. 
59. Id. at 231 .  
60. Id. at  231-32. 
61. Id. at 232-33. 
62. Id. at 241. 
63. Id. 
64. Rafael La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. POL ECON. 1 1 13, 1 140 (1998) 
[hereinafter La Porta et al., Law and Finance]. 
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the coefficient for per capita GDP becomes insignificant.65 In sum, the 
reasons that countries vary in their R2s are not just differences in their 
structural characteristics such as country size and diversity of industry. 
An institutional factor - the quality of government - appears to play 
an important role as well. 
The discovery that governmental quality plays an important role in 
explaining differences among countries leads MYY to hypothesize 
that R2 might be a good inverse proxy for price informedness.66 We 
believe this is a plausible hypothesis. Our reasoning begins with the 
observation that the predictability of future cash distributions to a 
firm's outside shareholders depends on two factors: one is the 
predictability of the level of the firm's underlying cash flows; the 
second is the predictability of the division of these underlying cash 
flows between the outside shareholders on the one hand and inside 
shareholders and other firm stakeholders on the other. 
In countries with low good-government scores, extralegal 
governmental influence will play a larger role in determining both the 
level of firm cash flows and the division of these cash flows. In low 
good-government score countries, a firm's profitability can be 
dramatically affected by whether or not it has close relationships with 
governmental officials - the persons who grant government contracts, 
issue licenses, and determine when to enforce regulations. Also, in 
such countries the division of a firm's cash flows will deviate from the 
standard corporate law model of pro-rata distribution among all 
shareholders. Instead, inside shareholders receive, in one form or 
another, more than a pro-rata share of the wealth generated by a 
firm's activities, and other stakeholders receive more than a market 
return for their contributions to the firm.67 These deviations come at 
the expense of outside shareholders. The closer a firm's inside 
shareholders and other stakeholders are to governmental officials, the 
greater the governmental tolerance of such deviations. 
This larger extralegal governmental influence on the amount of 
distributions ultimately reaching outside shareholders makes these 
distributions harder to predict. To start, in low-score countries, the 
cash flow levels of firms themselves are harder to predict. This is 
because the impact of extralegal governmental influences on cash 
flows from one firm to the next is harder to predict than the purely 
market factors that would determine firm cash flows in the absence of 
such influence. The problem of predicting the impact of such influence 
65. Morck et al., supra note 55, at 241 .  
66. Id. at  242-43. 
67. Russia provides an excellent case study of this problem. See Bernard Black et al., 
Russian Privatization and Corporate Governance: What Went Wrong?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 
1731 (2000); Merritt B. Fox & Michael A. Heller, Corporate Governance Lessons from 
Russian Enterprise Fiascoes, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1720, 1740-45, 1762-71 (2000). 
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on the cash flows of any one particular firm is aggravated by the 
opaque, erratic nature of political regimes prevalent in many emerging 
countries.68 In addition, the proportion of this cash flow that will 
ultimately be paid to outside shareholders of a firm in a low-score 
country is itself less predictable. In such a country, outside 
shareholders are, as noted, relatively unprotected legally.69 The total 
amount of distributions that these shareholders receive over the life of 
the firm is arbitrary. Outsiders receive what is left over, if anything, 
after the inside shareholders and other stakeholders have taken what 
their positions of political power allow them to get, plus, perhaps, the 
occasional distribution to outsiders made for strategic reasons. 
The last step in our reasoning concerns the effect of these less 
predictable distributions to outside shareholders on the process of 
share pricing. When future distributions to outside shareholders are 
' harder to predict, na"ive speculators - the "noise traders" - are more 
likely to become confused. This confusion on the part of the noise 
traders adds to the risk undertaken by rational smart money 
speculators - the risk arbitrageurs - who bet against such noise 
traders.70 This added risk makes it less attractive to be a risk 
arbitrageur, which means less such activity occurs in the economy. 
Less information about fundamentals (both firm-specific and market­
wide) is incorporated into share price because fewer risk arbitrageurs 
find it worthwhile to gather, analyze, and act on such information. As 
a result, the trading of the na"ive speculators ("noise trading") has a 
greater impact on price and share prices will less accurately reflect 
what the distributions to outside shareholders will ultimately tum out 
to be.71 This problem of a low level of risk arbitrage in countries with 
low good-government measures may be accentuated by the fact that in 
such countries, risk arbitrageurs may be less confident that they will be 
able to retain the profits that they do manage to make due to the 
possibility of confiscation.72 This lower level of risk arbitrage, with its 
consequent lower level of price informedness and hence price 
accuracy and higher level of noise trading, can be expected to be 
accompanied by the higher R2s that we observe in the low good­
government score countries. This is because the fads and fashions that 
motivate na"ive speculative traders tend to have uniform impact across 
the market. 
68. Morck et al., supra note 55, at 242-44. The idea that there will be more noise trading 
when future distributions to outside shareholders are less predictable is consistent with the 
idea that when less information is publicly available, less trading based on privately acquired 
and analyzed information will occur. See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text. 
69. See supra note 67 and accompanying text. 
70. De Long et al., supra note 47, at 733; see also supra Part 11.A.3. 
71 .  Morck et al., supra note 55, at 244-47. 
72. Id. at 243. 
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In sum, the link between high R2s and low price informedness is 
established as follows. High R2s are observed to be associated with low 
good-government scores.73 Low good-government scores suggest that 
extralegal governmental influence will play a substantial role in 
determining future distributions to outside shareholders. The impact 
of this influence is harder to predict than the market forces that would 
otherwise determine the level of such distributions, thereby making 
the distributions themselves less predictable. This unpredictability 
confuses nai've speculative traders, causing them to act in ways that 
add to the risk of smart money speculation. This added risk depresses 
the level of risk-arbitrage activity, which has two consequences: one is 
that less information is impounded in prices, the other is that the nai've 
speculative traders have a larger role in setting prices. The fads and 
fashions that motivate the nai've speculative traders tend to have 
impacts across the market, and hence the larger role in the market 
played by the nai've speculative traders results in prices of different 
firms tending to move together more. As a consequence, country R2s 
will be higher. Thus, everything else being equal, a high R2 is 
indicative of a low level of risk arbitrage, which will result in a low 
level of price informedness. 
b. Further implications of the link between R2 and poor-quality 
government 
The implications of our analysis for share price informedness, 
however, go even deeper than this. It is true that the mechanisms of 
real economic efficiency promoted by share price accuracy still work 
to some extent even when prices are relatively less accurate. The 
greater extralegal governmental influence that drives up R2, however, 
not only leads to a lower level of share price accuracy, it also makes 
this lower level of price accuracy even less effective than it would 
otherwise be in promoting the functioning of these mechanisms of real 
economic efficiency. To see why, recall that a share price is less 
accurate when it is less likely to be close to the share's actual value, 
which is the discounted present value of what the future distributions 
to outside shareholders will ultimately turn out to be. In low good­
government score countries, a significant factor in this lower level of 
share price accuracy is the underlying unpredictability concerning the 
proportion of a firm's underlying overall cash flow that will ultimately 
reach outside shareholders. Thus, share price is doubly less informed 
in terms of being an estimate of the firm's underlying overall cash 
flows. This result is critical because the theory suggesting that accurate 
share prices enhance real economic efficiency assumes that accurate 
73. See supra note 65 and accompanying text. 
364 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 102:331 
share prices are good estimates of future underlying overall firm cash 
flow.74 A firm's residuals are, under this theory, assumed reliably to go 
largely to its shareholders, and every shareholder, whether inside or 
outside, is assumed to receive a pro-rata distribution of these 
residuals. In short, share prices in a country with a low quality 
government are doubly disabled in their capacity to promote 
efficiency in the real economy. First, because there is less risk 
arbitrage, share prices are poorer predictors of future distributions to 
outside shareholders. Second, future distributions to outside 
shareholders are themselves less reliable indicators of a firm's 
underlying cash flow. It is the accuracy of prices as predictors of firm 
cash flows that promotes the effectiveness of the mechanisms of 
efficiency in the real economy.75 
c. Other indirect evidence that R2 is a good inverse proxy for price 
informedness 
Two other pieces of indirect evidence help support the hypothesis 
that R2 is an inverse proxy for price informedness. First, the average 
R2 for U.S. firms has decreased significantly over the twentieth 
century, particularly since World War II.76 This corresponds to a 
period in which, for both technological and institutional reasons, more 
information has become available for risk arbitrageurs to use, even 
putting mandatory disclosure aside. 
Second, MYY examined a subsample consisting of R2s of all the 
developed countries in their study. In the regressions they ran to try to 
explain the differences in R2s among these countries, they included, as 
an additional independent variable, another La Porta et al.77 index, 
one purporting to measure the protection of outside shareholders 
through rights that help them control directors. MYY found that the 
coefficient for this index was negative and statistically significant, thus 
suggesting an inverse relationship between the level of such 
protections and country R2•78 
MYY's explanation for this result starts with the assumption that 
in a country with weak protection for outside shareholders, managers 
will find it easier to divert a larger portion of the firm's cash flow to 
themselves.79 These managers are more likely to divert extra cash flow 
generated by favorable firm-specific developments than extra cash 
74. See supra Part II.B.2. 
75. See supra Part l.B.2. 
76. Morck et al., supra note 55, at 220-22. 
77. La Porta et al., Law and Finance, supra note 64, at 1 126-28. 
78. Morck et al., supra note 55, at 255. 
79. Id. at 216-17. 
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flow generated by favorable developments in the economy as a 
whole.80 This is because a diversion of the firm-specific, development­
gerterated income is less likely to be detected since outsiders know 
more about changes in economy-wide factors than about changes in 
firm-specific factors. Thus changes in firm cash flow due to changes in 
economy-wide factors are more likely to be passed on to outside 
shareholders. As a consequence, these changes in economy-wide 
factors are likely to affect distributions to outside shareholders more 
than they affect the underlying cash flow of the firm. The result will be 
the higher R2s that are observed in the data for countries with a lower 
level of protection for outside shareholders. This effect will be 
accentuated by the fact that, relative to countries with more 
protection, risk arbitrageurs in low-protection countries will rationally 
devote more of their attention to predicting economy-wide factors and 
less to predicting firm-specific factors. They will allocate their 
attention in this fashion because these economy-wide factors play a 
larger role in determining distributions to outside shareholders.81 In 
conclusion, while the higher R2s in such countries do not necessarily 
indicate that share prices are less accurate predictors of future 
distributions to outside shareholders, they will be less accurate 
predictors of underlying firm cash flows and thus will not perform 
their real economy efficiency-enhancing functions as well as do share 
prices in countries with greater shareholder protections.82 
3. Direct Test of R2 as a Proxy for Share Price A ccuracy 
Durnev, Morck, Yeung, and Zarowin ("DMYZ") examine more 
directly the usefulness of R2 as an inverse proxy for share price 
accuracy by examining the relationship between a firm's R2 and the 
extent to which its share price reflects future versus current eamings.83 
For a set of U.S. firms, DMYZ go back in time and regress each firm's 
then-current stock price on its then-current and -future earnings. They 
find that future earnings explain more of the share prices of low R2 
firms than firms with high R . In other words, share prices of lower R2 
firms are better predictors of their future earnings than share prices of 
high R2 firms. 
This finding provides much more direct evidence that low R2 firms 
have more accurate share prices. Remember that a more accurate 
share price is one that better predicts future shareholder distributions. 
Future distributions can only come from presently known existing 
80. Id. at 254. 
81. Id. 
82. See supra Part 11 .A.2. 
83. Artyom Durnev et al., Does More Firm Specific Stock Price Variation Mean More or 
Less Informed Pricing?, 41 J. ACCT. RES. 797 (2003). 
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assets or future cash flows; and future earnings are, on average, a 
reasonably good proxy for future cash flows. 
III. SHARE PRICE ACCURACY AND EFFICIENCY IN THE REAL 
ECONOMY 
The adherents of the position that share price accuracy is relevant 
to efficiency believe, based primarily on theory, that share price 
accuracy improves the quality of choice among new proposed 
investment projects in the economy and improves the operation of 
existing firm assets.84 Two recent studies that examine the relationship 
of R2 and measures of the efficiency of capital allocation help to 
confirm empirically the existence of at least the first of these two 
effects. 
A. Cross-Country Comparisons 
The first study, conducted by Professor Jeffrey Wurgler, involves 
cross-country comparisons.85 Wurgler constructs a measure of the 
efficiency of capital allocation that posits that capital is well allocated 
when there is more investment in industries that are growing rapidly 
and less investment in declining industries. Using a data set that spans 
twenty-eight manufacturing industries across sixty-five countries and 
over thirty-three years, Wurgler finds a significant negative 
relationship between this measure of capital allocation efficiency and 
highly synchronized stock price returns.86 Thus, capital appears more 
likely to be allocated to the most promising investment opportunities 
in countries with low synchronized stock returns than in countries with 
high ones. 
84. See supra Part l.B.2. 
85. Jeffrey Wurgler, Financial Markets and the Allocation of Capital, 58 J. FIN. ECON. 
187 (2000). 
86. Wurgler's measure is an elasticity of capital expenditure with respect to value added, 
i.e., 
I V 
In � =  a + 1]  Jn _.!£!_ + &. /. c c V, 1.c.t 
1,c,t-I t,c,t-1 
where I is gross fixed capital formation, V is value added (sales minus cost of intermediate 
goods), and i, c, and t are subscripts for manufacturing industry, country, and time, 
respectively. Wurgler's results, when combined with our results reported infra in Part IV 
suggesting that mandatory disclosure can lower R', are consistent with findings by La Porta 
et al. that laws that protect outside investors, including mandatory disclosure laws, improve 
the efficiency of investment allocation. Rafael La Porta et. al., Investor Protection and 
Corporate Governance, 58 J. FIN. ECON. 3, 4 (2003) .  
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B. Cross-Industry Comparisons 
The second study, conducted by Durnev, Morck, and Yeung, 
involves cross-industry comparisons within the United States.87 This 
study uses a somewhat different measure of the efficiency of 
investment allocation, looking at each firm's marginal Tobin's Q ratio, 
which measures a firm's increase in market value relative to its 
increase in the book value of its capital stock.88 In a tax-free world, the 
optimal level of this measure is one. A value greater than one suggests 
that positive net present value ("NPV") projects are being missed, and 
thus the firm is passing up projects that would cost less than their 
expected future returns discounted to present value. A value less than 
one suggests that negative NPV projects are being implemented, and 
thus that the firm is investing in projects that cost more than the 
present value of future expected returns. An economy is making the 
most efficient use of its scarce savings when it implements all proposed 
investment projects with positive NPVs and no proposed projects with 
negative NPVs. Durnev, Morck, and Yeung find that the closeness of 
this measure to its optimal level is inversely related to the industry's 
average R2• This result holds up after controlling for differences 
among industries in the extent to which their earnings are sensitive to 
economy-wide factors. Importantly for adherents to the share price 
relevance position, the result also holds whether or not firms in the 
industry engage in extensive external financing. This finding is 
contrary to what would have been predicted by the institutional 
skeptics among the share price irrelevance adherents, who doubt the 
relevance of share price accuracy to the real economy because of the 
small percentage of new investment that is funded by public offerings 
of equity.89 
C. An Answer to the First Big Question 
These cross-country and cross-industry studies demonstrate that 
low R2 is associated with high measures of investment allocation 
efficiency. This finding, combined with the findings reported above 
that low R2 is associated with greater share price accuracy, leads to the 
important conclusion that more accurate share prices improve the 
quality of choice among new proposed investment projects in the 
economy. Thus, we have an affirmative answer to the first big 
87. Artyom Durnev et al., Value Enhancing Capital Budgeting and Firm-specific Stock 
Return Variation, 59 J. FIN. 65 (2004).  
88. Tobin's Q is  the ratio of the market value of a company's debt and equity to the 
current replacement cost of its assets. See James Tobin, A General Equilibrium Approach to 
Monetary Theory, l J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 15 (1969). 
89. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
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question. Contrary to the position of the irrelevance adherents, the 
empirical evidence suggests that the efficiency of the real economy 
(the actual production of goods and services) is enhanced when share 
prices become more accurate. 
IV. MANDATORY D ISCLOSURE AND SHARE PRICE ACCURACY 
We still need to address the second big question: do mandatory 
disclosure requirements in fact result in the revelation of useful 
information, as adherents of the mandatory disclosure effectiveness 
position believe, or does most of the information impounded in share 
prices come via routes other than mandatory disclosure, as the 
ineffectiveness adherents believe? 
Prior empirical research relating to this question has focused 
primarily on the effect on share price and on price variance from the 
imposition in the 1930s of the Securities Act's and Exchange Act's 
mandatory disclosure provisions. The overall conclusion is that there 
was no statistically significant price change as a result of these 
requirements, but that there was a reduction in variance. As indicated 
in Part II, the implications of the reduction in firm-specific variance 
are ambiguous.9() 
In this Part of the Article, we present the results of a study that 
uses the R2 methodology to examine more directly the price-accuracy 
effects of mandatory disclosure. The study concerns the effects of a 
change in disclosure rules in December 1980 that enhanced 
requirements concerning management's discussion and analysis of 
issuer financial condition and operating results (MD&A). This change 
for the first time in effect required managers to disclose any material 
information suggesting that the issuer's most recent results are not 
necessarily indicative of future operating results or future financial 
condition. In the study, we observe a statistically significant reduction 
in R2 after imposition of the new requirements. This suggests that 
share prices did in fact become more informed as a result of the 
enhanced MD&A requirements. Such a result is strong evidence that 
mandatory disclosure can in fact increase the amount of meaningful 
information reflected in share prices and increase share price 
accuracy. 
A. History of the Enhanced MD&A Requirements 
The SEC historically prohibited disclosure of forward-looking 
information in SEC filings with the stated purpose of protecting 
90. See supra Part Il.B. 
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unsophisticated investors.91 This prohibition was much criticized since 
share valuations depend on future cash flows and management has 
significant insight concerning the factors that will determine these cash 
flows.92 Starting in the 1970s, the SEC began to soften and then 
ultimately reverse its stance. In 1974, the SEC's Division of 
Corporation Finance issued the Guides for the Preparation and Filing 
of Reports and Registration under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
that included a new Guide 1 (Summary of Operations).93 Taking the 
position that issuer disclosure, in addition to the "columnar 
presentation of financial data," required information of "material 
significance to investors in appraising the results shown," the 1974 
Guides called for "the type of supplementary information needed to 
explain periodic changes in financial data included in the summary of 
earnings."94 
In the 1974 Guides, the SEC also added a requirement for a 
separate section in issuer disclosure documents entitled 
"Management's Discussion and Analysis," to be placed after the 
summary of earnings. In stating what it wanted� the SEC gave its first 
highly tentative bow toward requiring forward-looking information: 
The purpose of this statement is to provide investors with management's 
analysis of the financial data included in the summary through a 
discussion of the causes of material changes in the items of the summary 
and of disclosure of the dollar amount of each such change and the effect 
of each such change on the reported results for the applicable periods. 
This discussion is necessary to enable investors to compare periodic 
results of operations and to assess the source and probability of 
recurrence of earnings (losses).95 
Issuers, however, tended to read these requirements narrowly and 
in December 1980, the SEC adopted, through revisions of Item 303(a) 
91. See Disclosure to Investors - A Reappraisal of Administrative Policies Under the 
'33 and '34 Acts, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 'lI 74,601, at 74,603 (Feb. 2, 1973) [hereinafter 
Wheat Report] ("[P]rojections in filed documents might become traps for the unsophisticated 
who would be prone to attach more significance to such projections than they deserve."); see 
also Harry Heller, Disclosure Requirements Under Federal Securities Regulation, 16 Bus. 
LAW. 300, 307 (1971) (noting that the SEC considered the investor as good as anyone at 
predicting the future and that having companies attempt to predict future earnings would be 
misleading because it would suggest a competence and authority in predicting that did not 
exist). For one example of the SEC's policy prohibiting projections because they would be 
misleading, see 17 C.F.R. § 270.14a-9 (1976) (withdrawn in 1976) (proscribing predictions of 
specific future market values, earnings, or dividends in proxy statements); see also Joel 
Seligman, The SEC's Unfinished Soft Information Revolution, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 1956 
(1995). 
92. See, e.g. , Kripke, supra note 33, at 1151 .  
93. See Securities Act Release No. 5520, 39 Fed. Reg. 31,894 (Sept. 3 ,  1974) [hereinafter 
the 1974 Guides]. 
94. Id. at 31 ,895-96. 
95. Id. at 31,895. 
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of Regulation S-K, the much more explicit set of requirements in its 
MD&A rules that are the subject of this study.96 These rules have been 
essentially unchanged since.97 Specifically, Item 303(a)(3)(ii) requires 
the issuer to "describe any trends or uncertainties that have had or 
that the registrant reasonably expects will have a material favorable or 
unfavorable impact on net sales or revenues or income"98 and to 
report on "events that will cause a material change in the relationship 
between costs and revenues."99 Most significantly, instruction 3 to 
paragraph 303(a) tells issuers to "focus specifically on material events 
and uncertainties known to management that would cause reported 
financial information not to be necessarily indicative of future 
operating results or future financial condition. "100 This instruction in 
essence means that if there is no disclosure, investors are entitled to 
view current results as a management projection of future results. 
Dean Joel Seligman underscores the importance of these new 
provisions, especially for troubled companies: 
This Item is of particular significance for "troubled companies" and is a 
key part of the evolution of the Commission's approach to accounting 
from an emphasis on "hard facts" to its emphasis on "soft" or forward­
looking information. It is a comprehensive disclosure item. In effect, the 
Commission staff has employed the concepts of liquidity and capital 
resources to require managers to comment on material changes that may 
occur in a registrant's balance sheet. The Commission has used the 
concept of results of operations to require similar disclosures concerning 
a registrant's income statement.101 
B.  Test Design and Procedures: Hypothesis HJ 
The enhanced MD&A requirements imposed in December 1 980 
present an excellent opportunity to test the effectiveness of mandatory 
disclosure in promoting share price accuracy. The changed regulations 
on their face call for disclosure of significant information that was not 
previously required to be disclosed. We seek to determine whether 
share price accuracy, as measured by R2, in fact improved as a result of 
the changed regulations. We set up the test in a way that attempts to 
96. Proposed Revision of Regulation S-K, Exchange Act Release No. 17,399, 21 SEC 
DOCKET 1052 (Dec. 23, 1980). 
97. Compare Regulation of Transfer Agents, Exchange Act Release No. 17,1 14, 20 SEC 
DOCKET 1277 (Sept. 2, 1 980), and Amendments to Annual Report Form, 45 Fed. Reg. 
63,630 (Sept. 25, 1980), with 17 C.F.R. § 229.303 (2003). 
98. 17 C.F.R. § 229.303. 
99. Id. 
100. Id. 
101. Seligman, supra note 91, at 1968 (citing 17 C.F.R. § 229.303 (2003) and Exchange 
Act Release No. 34,831 ,  Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 'II 85,436, at 85,783 n.39 (Oct. 13, 1994) 
(safe harbor for forward-looking statements)). 
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best control for any other events occurring at the same time that might 
also influence R2• We do this by comparing the change in R2 of two 
groups of firms - high-return firms and middle-return firms - after 
adoption of the regulation. As explained below, we have reason to 
believe that the changed regulations, if effective, will promote more 
additional disclosure by the middle-return firms than by the high­
return firms and hence lead to a greater reduction in the R2s of the 
middle-return firms relative to those of the high-return firms. We find 
that the middle-return group indeed did have a greater reduction in 
Rz. 
1. Assumption Driving Test Design 
Our test design assumes that issuer managers will be more likely, 
other things being equal, to reveal voluntarily in a timely fashion good 
news than bad news. In addition to the tendency to put off unpleasant 
tasks that seems part of human nature, managers of bad-news firms 
often have incentives to defer revelation of the negative information. 
They may hope, for example, that subsequent, chance good news will 
obscure the effects of past, unrevealed mistakes. Also, their time 
horizons may be shortened by their compensation schemes or pending 
retirements and so an immediate price drop would hurt them while 
one at some point in the future would not. This assumption that bad 
news is disclosed more slowly is in accordance with both theoretical 
and empirical findings on the matter. 102 Thus, a smaller portion of 
102 See HARRISON HONG ET AL., BAD NEWS TRAVELS SLOWLY 16 (Nat'! Bureau of 
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 6553, 1998) (discussing the momentum strategy, which, 
based on findings that for some stocks past share price changes predict future ones, works 
much better for firms with low analyst coverage than high; this effect of low analyst coverage 
is much more pronounced, however, where the firms are past losers than past winners 
because firms release good news more freely than bad news and so the marginal contribution 
of analysts in getting bad news out is greater than in getting good news out); Anne E. 
Chambers & Stephen H. Penman, Timeliness of Reporting and the Stock Price Reaction to 
Earnings Announcements, 22 J. ACCT. RES. 21, 39 (1984) (stating that interim and annual 
earnings reports reported later than average, relative to their history, are accompanied by 
negative share price reaction); William Kross & Douglas A. Schroeder, An Empirical 
Investigation of the Effect of Quarterly Earnings Announcement Timing on Stock Returns, 22 
J. Acer. RES. 153, 173 (1984) (same finding for quarterly earnings announcements); Lang & 
Lundholm, supra note 45, at 269 (finding in an examination of cross-sectional variation of 
published analysts' evaluations of firms' disclosure practices, that firms rated as having more 
forthcoming disclosure have, after controlling for other factors, higher earnings and returns); 
Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why Corporations 
Mislead Stock Market Investors (and Cause Other Social Harms), 146 U. PA. L. REV. 101, 
107-09 (1997) (stating that corporations do not disclose bad news for a variety of reasons: 
one is the fear of high level management that doing so will have a negative effect on 
employees or customers, two, there is a tendency for lower level employees to be less likely 
to report bad news than good news up the line, and, three, there is a tendency for top 
managers to have "perceptual filters" that cut out bad news, the filters being functional and 
hence persistent because the optimism they reflect aids morale); Ranga Narayanan, Insider 
Trading and the Voluntary Disclosure of Information by Firms, 24 J. BANKING & FIN. 395 
(2000) (outlining a theoretical model where bad news is less likely to be disclosed quickly 
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firms experiencing bad news will voluntarily disclose it in the period in 
which it is experienced compared to the portion of firms experiencing 
good news. 
2. Implications 
This difference in the timing of voluntary disclosure for firms with 
good and bad news creates the opportunity to test whether an increase 
in required disclosure results in greater share price accuracy. To the 
extent that disclosure is voluntary, in a given year a firm experiencing 
good news relative to other firms in its industry should have a better 
return than the industry average that year because the firm is likely to 
get its good news out quickly. A firm experiencing bad news relative 
to other firms in its industry in a given year should, in contrast, have a 
return (i) below its industry average for that year where the bad news 
is revealed during the year, or, (ii) equal to the industry average for 
that year where the bad news is not revealed during the year, with 
share price instead being marked down in the subsequent year when 
the bad news eventually does become revealed. 
With this in mind, consider, for any given period and for any given 
industry, three groups of firms: 
1. The first group - the good-return group - are firms that 
have market returns above the industry average by some 
threshold percentage, for example 10% or more. These 
firms have good news that occurred during this period. 
2. The second group - the bad-return group - are firms 
that have market returns below the industry average by 
the threshold percentage or more. These firms have bad 
than good news because. with good news, managers trade off the positive effects of speedy 
disclosure on their performance-based compensation with the ability to make insider trading 
profits afforded by delayed disclosure, but with bad news, there is no tradeoff, and only 
delay provides an opportunity for profit); Marc I. Steinberg & Robin M. Goldman, Issuer 
Affirmative Disclosure Obligations - An Analytical Framework for Merger Negotiations, 
Soft Information, and Bad News, 46 MD. L. REV. 923, 948-49 (1987) (noting that "[i]ssuers 
understandably wish to delay disclosure of adverse news as Jong as possible" out of fear, for 
example, that immediate release of the bad news could cause a "snowball" effect in terms of 
losing customers, which might not happen if release is delayed and better news intervenes to 
soften it); Mark Lang & Russell Lundholm, Voluntary Disclosure and Equity Offerings: 
Reducing Information Asymmetry of Hyping the Stock (2000) (unpublished manuscript, on 
file with authors) (finding that, on average, six months before issuing new equity, firms 
increase their level of disclosure and much more of it is positive than negative information; 
for firms that do this, price goes up during the period leading up to the offer and down 
afterwards); Russell Lundholm & Linda Meyers, Bringing the Future Forward (2000) 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with authors) (finding that firms with more forthcoming 
disclosure policies have, after controlling for other factors, higher earnings and returns). 
There are some dissenters to this view. For example, Douglas Skinner suggests that firms 
who are expecting to announce a bad earnings report will disclose earlier in order to reduce 
the risk of legal liability. Douglas Skinner, Why Firms Voluntarily Disclose Bad News, 32 J. 
Acer. RES. 38, 38-39 (1994). 
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news that is revealed during this period but that 
occurred either in this period or in some prior period. 
3. The third group - the middle-return group - are firms 
that have market returns in between the other two 
groups. These firms either have no news or have 
unrevealed bad news. 
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This analysis of the relationship between each of the three groups 
of firms and the kinds of news that they are experiencing has an 
important testable implication. A regulatory reform that effectively 
increases firm disclosure over what would be revealed voluntarily will 
have a differential effect on the composition of these three groups of 
firms in terms of the kinds of news they are currently experiencing. 
Firms with current or past unrevealed bad news that they would, but 
for the reform, have kept unrevealed will be in the bad-return group 
instead of in the middle-return group. As a consequence, the middle­
return group will now be composed of a less mixed set of firms: a 
larger proportion will have no news and a smaller proportion will have 
unrevealed bad news. Thus, a larger portion of middle-return group 
firms will have prices that reasonably reflect their actual values. The 
high-return group would not experience a similar change in 
composition and thus for this group there would not be as great a 
change, if any, in the portion whose prices reasonably reflect their 
actual values. 
3. Testable Hypothesis 
These implications suggest a testable hypothesis with respect to the 
effect on share price accuracy of the enhanced MD&A requirements: 
Hl: If the enhanced requirements increase share price 
accuracy, the decrease in the R2 of the middle-return 
group should exceed the decrease in the R2 of the 
good-return group. 
4. Advantages of the Test Design 
This test design has a distinct advantage over a simple time series 
comparison of the average R2 of all firms before and after imposition 
of the enhanced MD&A requirements. R2 is affected by 
macroeconomic and industry environmental factors that change from 
one period to the next. In a simple time series comparison, these 
changes would create noise that would make it harder to detect any 
shift in the amount of information impounded in price as a result of 
the enhanced MD&A requirements. Instead, we examine, by industry, 
the change in R2 from before to after imposition of enhanced MD&A 
requirements for the middle-return group relative to the parallel 
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changes for the good-return group. This procedure washes out the 
effects on R2 over this period of time from changes in industry and 
macroeconomic factors. This is because there is little reason to think 
that any changes in these factors would have a different impact on R2s 
of the good-return group than on those of the middle-return group in 
any given industry. The impact of the enhanced MD&A requirements 
is thereby singled out. 
5. The Sample 
We used the following sets of firms for our sample. For 1980, the 
year before implementation of the enhanced MD&A requirements, 
we selected a sample of 2690 firms from 130 three-digit SIC code 
industries.103 For 1982, the year after implementation of the enhanced 
MD&A requirements, we selected a sample of 2988 firms from the 
same 130 three-digit industries. We calculated the R2s and annual 
returns of all the firms in each year's sample.104 We sorted each year's 
samples into the 130 different industries and, for each firm in each 
industry, placed it into one of these groups: 
G (good-return firms), each of which have a market return for the 
year, r > r i3 * ( 1 + T) 
B (bad-return firms), each of which have r < r;3 *(1 - T) 
M (middle-return firms), each of which have r such that ri3 *(1-T) < 
r < r;3 *(l+ T) 
where r is the firm's return for the year, T is a fraction, and ri3 is the 
average return in the firm's industry for the year. In our initial 
calculations, we chose a threshold T of 10% or 0.10. Thus, for each 
year, we had 390 observations: three return groups from each of 130 
industries. We can then observe the change in the average R2 from 
1980 to 1982 for each of the 390 industry return groups. 
6. The Calculations 
We started our calculations, as indicated, by determining the R2 for 
all the firms in each year's sample. We did this by running for each 
year and for each firm a modified market model regression, with both 
market and industry betas, 105 using weekly returns for each firm. The 
103. The reform was adopted in December of 1980, too late to affect any significant 
amount of disclosure in that year. We view 1981 as a transition year and thus use 1982 as the 
postimplementation comparison year. 
104. The sources of data about these firms were the CRSP and COMPUST AT tapes. 
105. The market and industry betas that come out of the regression form a measure of 
the extent to which, respectively, market and industry-wide factors can be expected to move 
each individual firm's returns. 
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purpose of this calculation was to establish the amount of firm-specific 
variation in the returns of each firm (i.e. , the portion of the return that 
does not co-move with the market). This firm-specific variation was 
then used to calculate its R2• A weighted average R2 was then 
calculated for each of the three groups of firms, G, B and M, for each 
of the 130 industries, for each of the two years. To make the data more 
tractable to statistical analysis, each of these R2s was then transformed 
to create a natural log based index, 'l'g, i3. i (g = the return group, i3 = the 
industry, t = the year), that increases as the R2 decreases. 'I' is therefore 
a direct, not an inverse, proxy for informedness. These calculations are 
set out in detail in Table I in the Appendix. 
7. The Basic Statistical Test of Hypothesis HJ 
Remember that in testing hypothesis Hl we are exammmg 
whether, after adoption of the enhanced MD&A requirements, the 
middle-return group's share prices became better informed relative to 
those of the good-return group's prices. To determine this, we look at 
the mean change in 'I', the informedness measure, for each of the two 
groups. We see whether, consistent with hypothesis Hl, the mean 
change for the middle-return group is positive relative to the mean 
change for the good-return group. If so, we calculate the likelihood 
that the difference is due only to chance because of the ordinary 
underlying year-to-year variation in firm R2s.  This calculation is made 
in order to see how confidently we can rule out mere chance as the 
explanation for the difference in R2s between the two groups. 
More precisely, define for each group, G (good) or M (middle), 
Ll '1'g,i3 = 'l'g,i3,s2 - 'l'g,;3•80, i .e . ,  the change in our informedness measure for 
return group g ( = G or M) in industry i3 from 1980 to 1982. The null 
hypothesis to be tested is that Ll 'I' M.i3 = Ll 'I' c,;3, i.e., that the change in 
the informedness measure is the same for the middle-return groups as 
for the good-return groups. The alternative hypothesis Hl is 
Ll 'I'M ;3 > Ll 'I' c ;3, i.e., that the change in informedness for the middle­
retum group is greater than for the high-return group. The summary 
results of the test are as follows:106 
SUMMARY RESULTS: HYPOTHESIS Hl 
variable Mean std mm max 
Panel A: Stock return 
variation measures 
Differential log Ll 'I' G -0.070 0.708 -2.493 2.056 
transformation of relative 
106. A more complete report of these test results is set out in Tables II and III. 
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firm-specific variation of 
G firms 
Differential log 
transformation of relative 
firm-specific variation of 
M firms 
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0.995 - 1 .046 7.690 
Null Hypothesis Alternative 
Hypothesis 
Test Statistic Probability 
Value 
5.149 (0.00) 
These results show that, consistent with hypothesis Hl, the middle­
return group's mean improvement in the informedness measure, Ll1P, 
is 1.985 greater than that of the good-return group (which actually 
declined slightly) . Given a t statistic of 5.149, it is extremely unlikely 
that there was no actual change in the informedness of the prices of 
the two groups and that the observed difference in our measure of 
informedness is due simply to chance. Thus we can reject with a high 
degree of statistical confidence the null hypothesis in favor of the 
alternative hypothesis that after imposition of the enhanced MD&A 
requirements, the middle-return group experienced a greater increase 
in price informedness than did the good-return group. This strongly 
suggests that the enhanced MD&A requirements did prompt the 
disclosure of additional meaningful information. 
8. Multivariate Regression A nalysis of Hypothesis HJ 
As a check on these results, we also did a multivariate regression 
analysis of hypothesis Hl in order to see whether changes between 
1980 and 1982 in other factors that influence firm R2 could explain the 
difference between the two groups in the amount of change of their 
R2s. We found that they could not. A firm's R2 may be affected by the 
size of the industry to which it belongs and the structure of that 
industry. As a way to control for the possibility that changes between 
1980 and 1982 in one or both of these industry factors accounted for 
the differences in the changes in R2 for the two groups, we ran a 
multivariate regression with the change of each return group from 
each industry as the dependent variable (i.e., 390 observations, 
consisting of the change in R2 from 1980 to 1982 for each of the three 
return groups for each of the 130 industries) .  As independent 
variables, we paired against each of these 390 observations changes 
between 1980 and 1982 in measures of these two industry factors for 
the industry into which the observation fell, plus dummies for whether 
or not the observation was in the good-return group, d0, and for 
whether or not it was in the bad-return group, d8• Each dummy 
equaled 1 if the observation was in its group and 0 if it 
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was not. 
In this test, hypothesis Hl would be confirmed if we could say with 
statistical confidence that d0 < 0 and dB < 0. Such a result would mean 
that after accounting for the effects of any changes in these industry 
factors, changes in the measure of informedness were, for firms in the 
good and bad-return groups, less than the average change for all firms. 
This result would show that firms in the middle-return group had a 
bigger change. In fact, as set out below, the calculations show that we 
can say with statistical confidence that d0 < 0 and dB < 0.101 
MULTIVARIATE REGRESSION RESULTS: HYPOTHESIS Hl 
Specification 
Dependent variable 
Good firms Good 









5. 1 I 5. 2 I 5.3 
Differential log transformation of relative 
firm-specific return variation, D. '¥ 
-0.521 -0.416 -0.429 













Number of observations 390 
* Numbers in parentheses are p-values 
9. Test of Whether Recession Prompted Bad-News Firms to Disclose 
Sooner 
The period during which the enhanced MD&A requirements were 
first taking effect was one marked by recession. This raises the 
possibility that it was the recession, not the enhanced MD&A 
requirements, that prompted firms with bad news to disclose it sooner 
than they otherwise would have. To test for this possibility, we ran the 
same tests as reported above, comparing the change in the 
informativeness measure for middle-return firms with that of good­
return firms, for two other periods in which a recession intervened: 
1989-92 and 2000-2001. For each of these two other periods, we find 
107. The control variables, the multivariate regressions, the simple correlations, and a 
fuller report of the regression results are set out in Tables IV, V, VI, and VII. 
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no statistically significant difference between the change in the 
informativeness measure for the middle-return group compared to 
that of the good-return group. The multivariate regression test for 
these periods produces the same results. Consequently we reject the 
possibility that it was the recession, not the enhanced MD&A 
requirements, that prompted firms with bad news to disclose it sooner 
than they otherwise would have after the imposition of these 
requirements in 1980. 
10. Robustness Tests 
As a further check, we looked to be sure that the results reported 
above are not an artifact of the particular periods that are compared 
or the threshold percentages used to define the good-, bad-, and 
middle-return groups. To do so, we ran our tests again using 
alternative periods and thresholds. We tried 1978-80 vs. 1982-83 and 
several other combinations of time periods. There was no change in 
results. We tried as the return threshold level T= 0.01, 0.02, 0.05, and 
0.15. There was again no change in results. 
C. Test Design and Procedures: Hypothesis H2 
1. Assumptions and Implications 
The assumption that issuer managers are more likely to report 
good news in a timely fashion than bad news, combined with the 
analysis above concerning the three groups of firms - good return, 
medium return and bad return - and the kinds of news they are 
experiencing,108 have a second testable implication. This relates to the 
number of firms in each return group. While, in each period, the mix 
of good news and bad news actually experienced by firms in an 
industry (relative to the average) is presumably steady and 
symmetrical, a regulatory reform that effectively increases firm 
disclosure would temporarily increase as well the number of firms in 
the bad-return group. Think of a pipeline that runs from the 
experience by a firm of a good or bad event to the event's public 
revelation. To the extent disclosure is voluntary, the bad news that is 
revealed in any given period will on average have spent more time in 
this pipeline than will have the good news revealed in the same period. 
In a steady state, we would nonetheless expect to see at any point in 
time the same symmetrical distribution of good and bad news being 
revealed (and hence of firm returns) that we expect to see in the 
distribution of good news and bad news actually experienced by firms 
each period, the bad news simply coming on average from an earlier 
108. See supra Parts IV.B.1-2. 
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point in time than the good news. The reform, if effective, would 
temporarily disrupt this steady state, however, and flush out some of 
the bad news that, but for the reform, would still have been in the 
pipeline and hence unrevealed until later. Thus, returns immediately 
after the reform would be asymmetrically distributed, with more firms 
having returns below the lower threshold than firms having returns 
above the upper threshold. The extra firms in the bad-return group 
would come out of the population that would otherwise have been in 
the middle-return group. 
2. Testable Hypothesis 
This implication suggests a second testable hypothesis with respect 
to the effect on share price of the enhanced MD&A requirements: 
H2: If the enhanced requirements increase share price 
accuracy, the population of firms with below-average 
returns should temporarily increase. 
3.  The Test of Hypothesis H2 
Define N0.80 as the percentage of firms in the bad-return group in 
1980 and N0•82 as the percentage of firms in the bad-return group in 
1982. The null hypothesis is that N8,80 = N8,82 and the alternative 
hypothesis H2 is that N8,80 < N8,82• The results of the test are as follows: 







Thus we can reject with a high degree of statistical confidence the null 
hypothesis in favor of the alternative hypothesis H2 that the 
proportion of firms that are in a bad-return group in 1982 is higher 
than in 1980. These results tend to confirm that the enhanced MD&A 
requirements prompted disclosure of meaningful information. The 
longer-term survey, set out in Figure 4, of the proportion of firms in 
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FIGURE 4 
Hypothesis H2 
The Proportion of B Firms by Year 
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CONCLUSION 
A central feature of debates concerning corporate and securities 
law reform across the world - the United States, other developed 
economies, and emerging economies alike - concerns the value of 
mandatory disclosure. Two big questions occupy much of the 
attention. Does the accuracy of equity prices really matter to an 
economy and, even if it does, will mandatory disclosure effectively 
contribute to share price accuracy? The debate concerning these 
questions has been largely at the level of theory. This article attempts 
to shed some empirical light on the matter using the new R2 
methodology. 
Given the dearth of useful empirical study of these questions, the 
findings reported here - that share price accuracy appears to enhance 
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the efficiency with which capital is allocated and that the management 
discussion and analysis disclosure requirements adopted by the SEC in 
late 1980 increased share price accuracy - have real importance. At a 
minimum, these findings suggest that the enhanced disclosure 
requirements under the recently adopted Sarbanes-Oxley Act may 
bear real fruit in terms of the better functioning of the underlying 
economy. They suggest as well that proposals to eliminate mandatory 
disclosure with reforms such as issuer choice of regulatory regime 
should be approached with caution. 
The work so far, however, is only a beginning. Many further 
questions merit investigation. The R2 methodology itself as a proxy for 
share price accuracy needs further testing. The relationship between 
R2 and other measures of efficiency in the real economy, such as 
country growth rates, needs to be explored. There needs to be further 
consideration of the question of whether in less developed countries, 
disclosure induced improvement in share price accuracy alone would 
lead to better economic performance. And, within the United States 
and other developed economies, there need to be further tests of other 
major disclosure rule changes to see if they too are accompanied by 
comparable declines in R2• The work to date shows the promise in 
these exciting future inquiries. 
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APPENDIX 
TABLE II 
j = firm; w = week; t = 1980, 1982 
rm = market return 
ri3 = Three-digit industry return defined as: 
El ,w,t ,w,t 1 ,w,t J ,W,t L k ·3 (w;k rk - w. r · ) 
��w; =  �3 - 1  
W = market value of company j in industry i3 
For each group (G, M, B) in each 3 digit industry, calculate: 
g = {G, M, BJ 
Take logistic transformation:'!' . = 1n( 1 - R:.i3.t l 9,13,t R2 g ,i3,t 
[Vol. 102:331 
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TABLE III 
Summary Results - I 
a 'PM > 0 in 102 out of 140 industries.  The proportion of a 'PM > 0 is 
significantly greater than 0.5 (p-value = 0.00) 
Relative firm-specific 
return variation of G 
firms in 1 980 
Relative firm-specific 
return variation of G 
firms in 1 982 
Relative firm-specific 
return variation of M 
firms in 1 980 
Relative firm-specific 
return variation of M 
firms in 1 982 
Relative firm-specific 
return variation of B 
firms in 1 980 
Relative firm-specific 
return variation of B 














return variation of B 
firms 
variable 
2 1 -R G,80 
2 1 -R G,82 
2 1 -R M,80 
2 1 -R M,82 
2 1 -R B,80 













0. 1 27 
std min max 
0.093 0.427 0.984 
0.096 0.460 0.969 
0. 1 1 3 0.37 1 0.948 
0 . 1 02 0.463 0.999 
0.096 0.424 0.99 1 
0 . 1 23 0.402 0.997 
0.708 -2.493 2.056 
0.995 - 1 .046 7.690 
1 .0 1 6  -3.527 4.825 
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TABLE IV 
Null Alternative Test Probability 
Hypothesis HYPothesis Statistics Value 
d'PG = O  d'PG > O - 1 . 1 25 (0.87) 
d'PM = 0 d'PG > O  5.162 (0.00) 
d'Pa = O  d'PG > O 1.429 (0.08) 
d'PM = d'Pa d'Pc > d'Pa 2.257 (0.0 1 ) 
d'PM = d'PG d'PM > Ll'Pa 5.149 (0.00) 
TABLE V 
Control Variables - Variables that Affect the R2 Estimates 
Industry Diversification 
D . . = J ,ie,t 
L k�j,i3  Ak ,r S k ,r 
L klfi,i 3 Akt 
11 D  · · 3 = D · ·3 19s2 - D · ·3 1 9so ) ,I ] ,I , ] ,I , 
Industry Size 
L k,,; ;3 ln(;r, Ak 1 ) 
s = _, , ' j,i3,t 
nj,i3,1 
!18 .  ·3 = s . "3 1 982 - s . ·3 1 980 j,l j,l  ' j,l ' 
Industry Structure 
/ . . 3 = �3 j,l  ,I V ft j,i3,t M · ·3 = I · ·3 1982 - I · ·3 1980 j,l j,l ' j,l ' 
ni.i.l.1 = number of firms in group j in industry i3 in year t 
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TABLE VI 
Multivariate Regressions 
�'I' . .  3 = a + do + ds = " Yk Z · ·3 k + e · ·3 ),I L..,,, ),I , ),I 
K 
where: 
j = {G, M, G}, 
385 
d0 and d8 are dummies indicating the above and below middle­
retum group, 
Zk are control variables 













transformation of relative 
firm-specific variation 
Differential size 
LlI Differential industry 
structure 
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TABLE VIII 
Regression Results 
Specification 5. 1 5 .2 5.3 
Dependent variable Log transformation of relative firm-
se.ecific return variation,� 'I' 
Good firms dc; -0.521 -0.416 -0.429 
industry dummy 
Bad firms ds (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
industry dummy -0.323 -0. 1 36 -0. 1 49 
Differential size 8S (0.01) (0.30) (0.30) 
-.024 1 -0.243 
(0.00) (0.00) 
-.0541 -0.065) 
Differential 81 (0.22) (0.20) 
industry 
structure 
Three-digit No no yes 
industry 
dummies 
F-statistic 10.670 18.780 15.1 10  
(0.00) (0.00) (0.03) 
Regression R2 0.052 0 . 163 0.371 
Number of industries 390 
